The United Kingdom wants nuclear F-35As for NATO, but London does not know how much they will cost or when they will be operational. The budgetary risk is significant.
In Summary
The British government has announced the purchase of 12 F-35A Lightning IIs to join NATO’s airborne nuclear mission. London is presenting this decision as a major reinforcement of deterrence and British influence within the Alliance. The problem is that, according to the Public Accounts Committee, the Department of Defense does not yet know how much it will cost to operate these aircraft, nor when they will actually be capable of carrying a US B61 tactical nuclear bomb. The British F-35 program already has a projected cost of £57 billion (approximately €67 billion) over 56 years, potentially rising to £71 billion (approximately €83 billion) if infrastructure, fuel, and personnel are included. Industrial delays, chronic underestimation of engineering requirements, and short-term budgetary trade-offs further undermine operational credibility. In short, London is buying a strategic role, but has no control over the final bill or the nuclear timetable.
The choice of direct participation in NATO’s nuclear mission
The United Kingdom has announced its intention to purchase 12 F-35A Lightning II aircraft. These aircraft will be capable of carrying a US B61 tactical nuclear weapon. This is not a marginal purchase. It is a clear political decision: to reintegrate British airborne nuclear capability into NATO’s arsenal.
This choice marks a strategic break. Since the end of the Cold War, British nuclear deterrence has relied almost exclusively on submarine-based deterrence using Vanguard-class submarines armed with Trident missiles. The ability to launch nuclear strikes from fighter jets disappeared in the late 1990s. The government is therefore reactivating an airborne nuclear posture. It is doing so at a time when Russia is stepping up regional nuclear threats and when the US guarantee in Europe is considered less automatic than it was ten years ago.
Prime Minister Keir Starmer presented this decision as a response to “strategic uncertainty” in Europe. The message is understandable: London wants to show that the United Kingdom remains a central player in NATO’s nuclear deterrence, not just a follower of the American umbrella. The signal sent to Moscow is clear: British territory will remain a possible platform for nuclear strikes by air for the benefit of the Alliance.
But this choice has an immediate operational cost. Participating in NATO’s “Dual Capable Aircraft” nuclear mission imposes strict standards: securing air bases, training crews, technical certification of aircraft, and integration of firing procedures under American control. This cannot be decreed. It must be financed. And this is precisely where the British system is beginning to crack.
The announced cost of the F-35A: a highly incomplete estimate
The Ministry of Defense claims that the F-35A costs between 20% and 25% less than the F-35B currently in service with the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy. The F-35B is the short takeoff and vertical landing version. The F-35A is simpler, lighter, and cheaper to purchase. According to estimates reported in the British financial press, each aircraft costs around £80 million (approximately €92 million). For 12 aircraft, this would bring the total cost to around £1 billion (approximately €1.15 billion).
On paper, this saving seems rational. The F-35A would cost less to purchase and maintain. The ministry is pushing this idea: same mission, better autonomy, lower operating costs. So it’s a good financial calculation.
This is a very partial presentation.
First, this unit price does not include adaptation to NATO’s nuclear role. However, this adaptation is not just a line of software. It is a complete chain: weapons storage procedures, physical protection of sites, reinforcement of shelters, hardening of ground-to-air communications, dedicated pilot training, military police, and 24-hour nuclear security teams. These costs have not yet been clearly budgeted. The Public Accounts Committee refers to a program “at an early stage” and admits that the Ministry of Defense is only “in the process of understanding” the requirements of this mission.
Second, the ‘aircraft’ cost says nothing about the “system” cost. The UK is not buying 12 weapons systems in the same way that one buys 12 cars. It is buying a strategic capability that will last for several decades. The total life cycle cost of the British F-35 is estimated at £57 billion (approximately €67 billion) over 56 years. This figure includes purchase, maintenance, training, spare parts, and software support. It does not include everything. The National Audit Office estimates that the actual bill is likely to reach £71 billion (approximately €83 billion). This difference of £14 billion (approximately €16 billion) is mainly due to personnel, infrastructure, and fuel, which the ministry has long underestimated.
To put it bluntly, the UK has bought a seat at the nuclear table. It does not yet know how much the chair will cost.
The structural problem of staffing and technical support
The parliamentary report goes even further. It does not just criticize the budgetary uncertainty. It refers to a lack of organizational preparedness on the part of the Department of Defense.
The Public Accounts Committee explains that the ministry miscalculated the number of engineers needed per aircraft. It failed to take into account simple human factors such as vacations, rotations, and ancillary tasks. The result is an “unacceptable” shortage of qualified technicians. This has direct consequences. Without enough mechanics to maintain the aircraft, operational availability plummets. If availability falls, pilots fly less. If they fly less, training hours decrease, and operational levels decline. This is not theoretical. The National Audit Office report has already noted that the British F-35 fleet only met about a third of its activity targets in the previous year. In other words, we are talking about an aircraft that is presented as “the best fighter the country has ever had,” but which does not fly as much as it should.
We need to look at this objectively. The F-35 is not a Tornado from the 1990s. It is an extremely complex system, packed with sensors, requiring a high level of maintenance and a constant stream of software updates. It is not enough to train a pilot. You also need to maintain an ecosystem of avionics engineers, software engineers, stealth specialists, and airframe and engine maintenance technicians. All of this has been underestimated. The public was sold on the argument that “high technology + domestic industrial employment = a good deal,” without mentioning that human resources would have to follow suit over a period of 20 years.
The Parliamentary Committee is clear on this point: the Ministry’s optimism about the F-35’s readiness is unrealistic.
Short-term British budgeting: save now, pay later
The Public Accounts Committee describes a recurring pattern. The Ministry of Defense defers certain expenditures to lower the annual bill. Then it ends up paying more later, while losing operational capabilities in the meantime.
Two concrete examples are cited. First, the deliberate delay in investing in an F-35 stealth testing facility. Postponing the investment resulted in an apparent saving of £82 million (approximately €94 million) in the 2024-2025 fiscal year. However, this decision adds £16 million (approximately €18 million) to the overall cost of the program, while creating a temporary gap in the ability to verify the aircraft’s radar discretion.
Second example: the postponement of infrastructure investments for 809 Naval Air Squadron until 2029. By postponing this work, the ministry has reduced immediate budgetary pressure. But this postponement has both reduced the squadron’s operational capacity and added nearly £100 million (approximately €115 million) in additional costs later on.
This behavior is politically rational in the short term (it shows that annual spending is being kept under control). It is militarily toxic. We save money this year. We pay more in five years. And above all, we degrade the real capability of the forces. In the air force, this decline in capability is not symbolic. If a squadron does not have its infrastructure ready, it cannot project power. Period.
The United Kingdom is not the only country affected by this accounting temptation. But here, the irony is obvious: London claims to be joining NATO’s airborne nuclear mission, thus taking on a major strategic role, while the national industrial and logistical apparatus is already struggling to keep the existing fleet running.
The nuclear timetable: no one wants to give a date
The heart of the matter is as much political as it is technical: when will these British F-35As actually be capable of carrying B61 tactical nuclear bombs under NATO command?
No public date has been given. The ministry acknowledged to MPs that it was still “in the process of understanding” the nuclear certification requirements demanded by NATO. Clear translation: even London does not know precisely when its aircraft will be declared fit for the shared nuclear mission.
This vagueness is not just a matter of administrative timing. It reveals dependence on the United States. The F-35A intended for NATO nuclear missions is certified to carry the American B61-12 bomb. This implies a technical and doctrinal interface controlled by Washington. The United Kingdom is therefore purchasing a nuclear capability that remains under American control. National deterrence? Officially, yes. Deterrence below American standards? In practice, yes, too.
This touches on a clear hypocrisy in political communication. London is selling this decision as a return of the Royal Air Force to the nuclear game, almost as a sign of European strategic autonomy. In reality, airborne nuclear capability will depend on an American weapons system, an American weapon, and a NATO doctrine of use validated by Washington.
To say that the United Kingdom is strengthening its sovereignty is debatable. Above all, it is strengthening its military integration into NATO, with a more active role. That is something else entirely.
The industrial and social argument: jobs, national industry, spin-offs
The ministry emphasizes the domestic economic impact. According to the ministry, the F-35 program supports around 20,000 highly skilled jobs in the United Kingdom. The national industry accounts for around 15% of global F-35 production. BAE Systems supplies airframe and avionics components. Rolls-Royce contributes to the propulsion system. Leonardo UK works on sensors and on-board electronics. MBDA is involved in air-to-ground and air-to-air weaponry in the medium term.
The argument is not without merit. The F-35 keeps a high-level aerospace industrial base running on British soil. According to figures put forward by the Ministry of Defense, the program generates around £22 billion (approximately €25 billion) in cumulative industrial work for British companies. This is a powerful political argument in a tense economic climate.
But we need to look at what this really means. The UK is in a situation where it is buying an integrated American platform, with American software dependency, but defending the purchase by explaining that it is about “good national jobs.” This is the compromise accepted by London: accepting strategic dependency to guarantee national industrial activity. Taxpayers are promised that these jobs justify the cost and the delays. What is not mentioned is that this technological dependence limits real military autonomy.
This choice is consistent with British industrial policy over the last 20 years: to remain in the club of the major military powers, but with largely Americanized equipment, rather than financing a complete sovereign industry on its own, as a truly integrated defense economy would do.
Operational risk: a still incomplete fleet
The last point, and a crucial one, is long-range air-to-ground strike capability. Members of Parliament note that the United Kingdom does not yet have an F-35 missile capable of striking a ground target from a safe distance. In other words, striking without entering the lethal zone of the enemy’s defenses.
Without this capability, the aircraft is forced to approach. Approaching means exposing itself. We are not talking about symbolic actions here. We are talking about penetrating a modern ground-to-air defense bubble, with systems capable of intercepting at over 100 km, and engaging high-altitude targets at supersonic speeds. The UK says this gap needs to be filled in the next decade, probably in the early 2030s, by integrating stand-off air-to-ground strike missiles on the F-35.
This means that London is currently purchasing political status—participation in NATO’s nuclear mission—while some critical aspects of its conventional strike capability will not be fully operational for several years.
Looking at it objectively, this is not a combat-ready purchase. It is a strategic purchase on credit.
Where this leaves the United Kingdom
The picture is clear. On the one hand, the British government is purchasing 12 F-35As to enable it to participate in NATO’s airborne nuclear mission. It is selling this decision as a strengthening of collective security and a revival of the Royal Air Force’s deterrent capability. It is emphasizing local jobs and the national industrial contribution, with 20,000 jobs and £22 billion in economic benefits.
On the other hand, the actual figures are not stable. The cost of the F-35 program has already reached £57 billion (approximately €67 billion) over the announced life cycle, and could in fact rise to £71 billion (approximately €83 billion) when infrastructure, fuel, and personnel are taken into account. Short-term budgetary trade-offs have already reduced the actual performance of the squadrons, delayed essential infrastructure, and generated future cost overruns. The shortage of engineers, delays in integrating certain weapon capabilities, and the lack of a clear timetable for nuclear certification show that political communication is ahead of actual military capability.
The British F-35 is sold to the public as “the best fighter jet the country has ever had.” Technically, this is not untrue: stealth, sensor fusion, tactical data link, air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities integrated into a single airframe. But the rest of the picture is less flattering. The UK is buying nuclear air deterrence that falls short of NATO standards, without full control over the schedule or the total cost. It is buying it on operational credit, with capability gaps to be filled by the early 2030s. And it is buying it under US political control.
This is a conscious choice: to pay a high price to remain at the European nuclear strategy table, even if it means accepting that the actual bill is not yet known, that technical availability is fragile, and that operational sovereignty remains shared.
Sources
Public Accounts Committee, House of Commons, October 2025 report
National Audit Office, F-35 Program UK summary, July 2025
UK Government Defense Procurement Announcements, June-October 2025
Hansard Parliamentary Record, “Nuclear-Certified Aircraft Procurement” debate, June 25, 2025
Defense Security Cooperation Agency and F-35 industry analyses (2024-2025)
Chatham House, strategic commentary on British nuclear participation in NATO, June 2025
Reuters, F-35A unit cost estimate and NATO nuclear role, June 2025
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