
NATO wants to impose a 30% increase in military capabilities on member states by 2025 to fill a major strategic deficit.
NATO is planning a 30% increase in military capability targets for its 32 members. This initiative responds to a growing strategic deficit, with member states already 30% behind current targets. The aim is not just to increase personnel, but to provide real operational capabilities, such as ready-to-deploy mechanized brigades, naval or air groups and modernized offensive capabilities. 80% of the States have already accepted this increase, but significant differences remain, particularly in real contributions and defense budgets. This structural change aims to balance the burden between the United States and Europe, with an emphasis on investment in long-range strike weapons, electronic warfare, integrated air defense and dual-use civil-military technologies.

The objective of a 30% increase in NATO military capabilities
The announcement of a 30% increase in military capability objectives constitutes a structural transformation of NATO military planning. This effort comes at a time when member countries are already 30% behind current objectives, according to Admiral Pierre Vandier. The new requirement does not impose a simple volume of personnel or equipment, but specific capabilities ready for use: mechanized brigades, naval groups, strike squadrons.
This development is part of a logic of operational projection and preparation. Unlike planning based on passive inventories, NATO now requires concrete operational readiness. The objective is to build a credible, modular, mobile and interoperable reaction force, capable of rapid intervention in several theatres.
From an operational point of view, this reform involves a reassessment of the force structure of each country: integration of combat drones, use of guided munitions, rapid deployment capacity, digital command system. For example, a mechanized brigade with 20% armed drones would be considered twice as effective according to NATO, which would make it possible to respond more quickly to capability objectives.
This reconfiguration of priorities will force each country to review its army model: so-called “format” armies, with units that are not very operational, will have to switch to armies ready for direct engagement, with a high level of technical and human availability. This structural transformation is, however, hampered by insufficient military investment, particularly in Europe.
The budget and capability deficit of European members
Despite the official target of 2% of GDP in defense spending, more than a third of European NATO countries do not meet this standard. In 2024, only countries such as Poland (3%) or the United Kingdom (2.3%) will exceed the target. Conversely, major countries such as Germany (1.6%), Italy (1.5%) and Spain (1.2%) remain below the minimum thresholds.
The capacity gap is strongly affected: according to projected data, the effective capacity of countries such as Germany or Spain is at 60% and 50% of the NATO target, generating a structural deficit of 40% to 50%. This weakness is not compensated for by sufficient industrial responsiveness. In contrast, Poland and the United States have a capacity rate of over 90%, due to a combined effort of spending and offensive capabilities.
The direct consequence of these delays is an imbalance in the military burden between the United States and Europe. The United States European Command has a budget of between 60 and 70 billion dollars a year, including approximately 100,000 military personnel deployed in Europe and the Sixth Fleet. This American domination of offensive tools (rocket artillery, precision strikes, strategic logistics) makes Europe structurally dependent.
This dependence reinforces Washington’s calls for autonomous management of European conventional capabilities, particularly in the event of a partial withdrawal of the United States from certain logistical or air commitments.
Conventional Offensive, Long-Range Strikes and Electronic Warfare
NATO is calling for a massive reconstitution of conventional offensive capabilities. Admiral Vandier has emphasized the need to reinvest in long-range artillery and tactical ballistic missiles, areas currently dominated by American stocks. The example of the European Long-range Strike Approach project, based on long-range land-based cruise missiles (over 500 km), constitutes a strategic axis for the reconstitution of deterrence.
Currently, less than 25% of long-range strike capabilities are European, compared to more than 70% held by the United States, according to Defense News estimates. Rebalancing capacity involves the creation of local production chains, via MBDA or KNDS, but also the direct purchase of American munitions in the short term (HIMARS, GLSDB, PrSM).
Electronic warfare has also been identified as a critical issue. The European armies have fragmented capabilities, which are often obsolete, whereas modern warfare requires systems capable of jamming communications, neutralizing radar and conducting integrated cyber attacks.
Finally, Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) is becoming a priority. Without credible SEAD capability, no air operation is viable. However, this capability is today essentially held by the US Air Force.

The challenge of enablers: logistics, refueling, ISR and command
NATO is insisting on strengthening operational support capabilities, the “enablers”. This involves investing in strategic logistics, air-to-air refueling, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems, and digital command tools.
Today, more than 70% of air-to-air refueling and ISR resources are provided by the United States. Without these capabilities, even an equipped army is still unable to sustain a prolonged operation. The aim is to ensure a European build-up, with projects such as the MRTT (Multi Role Tanker Transport) or the Eurodrone initiative, but the industrial lead times for full capability often exceed 10 to 15 years.
The digital command deficit is also alarming. NATO interoperable command systems (C2) remain insufficient, especially in secondary armies. The recent conflicts in Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh, however, show the importance of real-time processing of tactical information flows.
Dual technologies and the militarization of space
NATO is pushing for the integration of civilian technologies for military use: drones, AI, space sensors, robotics, etc. The militarization of space is becoming a central operational front. Europe must face up to Russian and Chinese capabilities: jamming satellites, orbital lasers, hostile de-orbiting systems.
The use of civilian satellite sensors makes it possible to pool costs: the same instruments that detect forest fires can identify military movements. This synergy is based on civil-military industrial integration, particularly in robotics, AI and autonomous systems.
But Europe is still lagging far behind in terms of active space capabilities. European military observation satellites represent less than 20% of the total space ISR capabilities available in NATO.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.