The return of pro-Assad loyalists to Syria is reviving a bloody conflict. Technical, military and geopolitical analysis of an escalating crisis.
Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December, Syria has seen a violent resumption of fighting, particularly in the coastal region of Latakia and Tartus. Armed groups loyal to the former president are fighting the forces of the new Islamist administration. The human cost is high, with more than 240 deaths in two days, including 125 civilians executed. This renewed violence reveals major security flaws and deep community divisions, and reactivates crucial regional military issues, particularly for Russia and Turkey. The confrontation now goes beyond the Syrian context to become an international strategic issue once again.
The resumption of fighting in Syria: a revived internal dynamic
The reactivation of fighting in March 2025 marks a critical turning point. The human toll is already heavy. According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), 125 civilians have been executed by the forces of the current government in the coastal region. At the same time, 100 members of the Syrian security forces were killed by factions loyal to Bashar al-Assad, along with 15 civilians killed in the attacks. These figures reflect a brutal deterioration in internal security, reminiscent of the early years of the Syrian conflict.
The intensity of the fighting has been concentrated around Latakia, Tartus, Jableh, Qardaha and Baniyas. These localities have historically been favorable to the Assad family and are home to a majority of Alawites, the religious minority to which the former president belongs. The region, long perceived as a loyalist stronghold, is now becoming an internal war zone, revealing the failure of the disarmament that followed the fall of the regime.
This partial, structured insurrection proves that the former regime’s military networks have not been completely dismantled. Geolocated videos by the BBC confirm the capture of military zones, the damage to command posts and coordinated operations carried out from the mountains of Latakia. Images also show the use of heavy machine guns, armored vehicles, and rocket launchers, suggesting that weapons caches have not been neutralized.
In response, the interim government has mobilized attack helicopters, armed drones, and heavy artillery, and has deployed several thousand additional troops from Damascus. The intensive use of air assets against internal rebel cells highlights the scale of the security risk.
Political and community consequences of the new outbreak of violence
This new internecine war reveals persistent community divisions. Tensions between the transitional Islamist government and the historically pro-Assad Alawite areas are reviving strong sectarian polarization.
The atrocities against civilians – notably the 40 people executed in al-Mukhtariya – risk the lasting radicalization of part of the Alawite population. In a country where sectarian tensions have already been exploited since 2011, this dynamic is particularly dangerous. The official discourse of the transitional authorities, calling for reconciliation, seems out of step with the punitive military operations on the ground.
The breakdown of the Syrian community fabric is worsening. In the rural areas of Homs and Latakia, reprisals against families deemed to be in favor of the former regime are becoming an uncontrollable form of local vengeance. The dynamics of an asymmetrical civil war risk becoming entrenched for the long term, with urban guerrilla zones, rural maquis and acts of collective reprisal.
On the political front, this situation partially delegitimizes the newly established Islamist government, which is struggling to guarantee security for all Syrians. President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s call for non-violence is not enough to contain a ground army that sometimes acts without clear leadership.
Finally, the proliferation of hotbeds of protest, particularly in the south of the country (Druze areas) and the north-east (Kurdish territories), suggests a gradual disintegration of central authority, a phenomenon already observed in Libya and Yemen.
Military and geopolitical issues related to the Syrian coastal region
Beyond the internal violence, the geostrategic dimension of the Syrian coastal region is decisive. Tartus and Khmeimim, Russian naval and air bases, are major assets for Moscow in the eastern Mediterranean. Tartus remains the only Russian warm-water port in the Mediterranean. Khmeimim has served as an operational platform for Russian strikes since 2015.
The upsurge in clashes around these sites is jeopardizing Russian logistical and operational continuity. Since 2022, some Russian troops have been redeployed to Ukraine, reducing their regional deterrent capacity.
To maintain their influence, the Russians will have to negotiate a security cooperation agreement with the transitional government, or consider a partial return of their forces. However, the Ukrainian context makes a military engagement highly unlikely in the short term. The preferred option would therefore be economic and technological support, in exchange for maintaining access to military infrastructure.
Furthermore, Turkey, an official supporter of the interim government, is stepping up incursions into the north. But its Kurdish objectives limit its capacity to invest elsewhere. The United States, a traditional supporter of the Kurds, is not intervening in this zone, creating an indirect rivalry over the distribution of spheres of influence.
Israel, meanwhile, has intensified its operations in southern Syria, taking advantage of the chaos to extend its buffer zone. These Israeli interventions are part of a strategy to secure the Golan Heights and deter Iran.
Prospects for the disintegration or reorganization of Syrian power
The current situation highlights the lack of institutional consolidation of the new Syrian government. Although the pro-Assad rebel attacks have been contained militarily, they reveal that the state apparatus remains weak, fragmented and vulnerable. The Islamist transitional government has neither a unified army nor homogeneous administrative control of the territory.
Community armed groups sometimes act in total autonomy, calling into question any prospect of centralization of power. There is therefore a real risk of seeing the emergence of a mosaic of rival zones of influence, locally dominated by militias, as is already the case in eastern Libya or in certain Iraqi regions.
Forced decentralization could therefore take hold, with local power struggles, ad hoc security agreements, and an absence of structured national governance.
The lack of economic reconstruction and international blockages on humanitarian aid, linked to the political vagueness, accentuate this disintegration. In March 2025, Syria’s GDP per capita is estimated to remain at less than €900 per year, 60% lower than in 2010. The scarcity of essential goods, inflation (estimated at nearly 135% over one year), and the creeping dollarization of the economy are exacerbating the precariousness of the population.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.