The YFQ-42A and YFQ-44A combat drones mark a technical turning point in the US air arsenal against China.
The US Air Force plans to purchase 1,000 combat drones, called YFQ-42A and YFQ-44A, to complement the F-35 fighters. These unmanned aircraft are intended to accompany manned aircraft on air-to-air missions, providing additional firepower at a lower cost. This is a structural change in air doctrine, with drones that are faster and better armed than older models such as the MQ-9 Reaper. This transformation raises operational, economic and strategic issues, particularly in terms of AI autonomy, unit costs, command ergonomics and cost-effectiveness. This development is part of a context of competition with China over technological air superiority.
The entry of drones into air combat: a tactical breakthrough
The announcement of the acquisition of 1,000 combat drones marks a technical transition for the US Air Force. Until now, drones were mainly designed for endurance and surveillance missions, with models such as the MQ-1 Predator or the MQ-9 Reaper, operating at low speed, long range, with limited attack capability.
The new YFQ-42A (General Atomics) and YFQ-44A (Anduril) prototypes introduce offensive air-to-air capability, supported by a tactical architecture of collaboration with F-35 Lightning II fighters. The objective is to increase the number of long-range missile vectors, in this case the AIM-120 AMRAAM, capable of striking at a range of over 160 kilometers. Each drone could carry two missiles, significantly increasing the firepower in an interception mission.
The projected costs for this program vary greatly depending on the source. The preliminary estimated budget for a fleet of 1,000 units would be 15 to 20 billion dollars, or about 13.9 to 18.6 billion euros, bringing the unit cost down to 13 to 18 million euros per drone depending on the configuration. By comparison, the cost of an F-35A is 80 million euros, which highlights the economic interest of the “Low-cost firepower multiplication” concept.
The addition of these drones would reduce the cost/efficiency ratio, as the same manned fighter can engage more targets with the support of drones.
A designation that reveals the doctrine
The designation “YFQ” reveals several major doctrinal elements:
- “Y” = operational prototype, preliminary stage to industrialization.
- “F” = Fighter, which distinguishes them from surveillance or multimission drones (type “MQ”).
- “Q” = Uncrewed, in accordance with NATO nomenclature.
The addition of the designation “F” indicates a semantic and tactical shift: these drones are not simply sensor platforms, but potential interceptors. Their place in the nomenclature of fighters (successor to the F-22, F-35, etc.) illustrates their integration at the heart of the air combat system.
However, these aircraft do not have supersonic capability or advanced stealth (the design of the YFQ-44A with a ventral air intake demonstrates this). Their role is therefore not to replace, but to complement manned fighters, by forming distributed formations, multiplying the firing axes.
Operational limitations and ergonomics issues
The integration of “Loyal Wingman” drones into an air group involves significant operational challenges. The most important is the ergonomics of control: will a single-seater F-35 pilot be able to simultaneously manage several drones without losing efficiency? The pilot’s already high cognitive load could compromise the mission if the human-machine interface is poorly designed.
Another issue is the level of autonomy of the drones. In the event of a data link failure, the drone must be able to identify, react and survive on its own. This requires AIs capable of real-time tactical decision-making in a jammed environment.
Initial simulations suggest limited capabilities: drones can fly in formation, react to a threat, receive a firing order, but are not yet able to carry out a complex maneuver without supervision. This dependence limits their autonomous use in depth.
Finally, their effectiveness remains dependent on the quality of the sensors of the manned fighter, which designates the targets. This model reinforces the idea that the drone remains an extension of the pilot, and not an autonomous entity in air strategy.
Strategic implications vis-à-vis China and cost models
The development of the YFQ-42A/YFQ-44A is part of the Sino-American technological rivalry. China is actively developing its own combat drones, such as the GJ-11 Sharp Sword, the Wing Loong-10, and the FH-97A program (inspired by the Loyal Wingman concept).
Public data indicates that Beijing plans to integrate stealth armed drones into its J-20 Mighty Dragon units, in particular to saturate enemy defenses. This race towards automation is based on precise budgetary criteria: the cost of the FH-97A is estimated at around 8 million euros, which is almost half the estimated cost of the American YFQ.
The American strategic debate therefore revolves around the choice between cheap disposable drones and more durable drones that are expensive but able to survive longer. In the long term, this will influence maintenance, training and attrition budgets. Each model implies a different operational philosophy: low-cost dispersal or quality concentration.
For the time being, the Pentagon seems to favor a semi-coordinated and semi-dependent model, leaving tactical control to humans. Greater autonomy will only be introduced once the on-board AIs have reached a sufficient level of reliability in a scrambled context.
Industrial prospects and flight testing
The first flights of the YFQ-42A and YFQ-44A prototypes are scheduled for the summer of 2025. Feedback from these tests will determine mass production decisions. If performance is deemed acceptable, the second batch of orders could follow as early as the end of 2026, with a potential production of 250 units per year, according to Congressional Budget Office estimates.
This also implies industrial restructuring. The partnership between Anduril (a Californian startup) and the Pentagon signals a partial shift of orders away from long-standing industrialists such as Lockheed Martin and Boeing. The integration of civilian technological players (AI, sensors, networks) is becoming a central lever of defense production.
This change of supplier also introduces industrial security risks in terms of cybersecurity, the supply chain and NATO interoperability.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.