Washington and The Hague are joining forces on CCA drones. A logical military choice, but one with far-reaching consequences for European autonomy.
In summary
The United States and the Netherlands have formalized a partnership around Collaborative Combat Aircraft, autonomous combat drones designed to fly alongside piloted aircraft, notably the F-35. The goal is simple: to create an affordable fleet of platforms capable of extending detection capabilities, carrying weapons, jamming the enemy, or absorbing some of the risk on behalf of pilots. For the U.S. Air Force, these drones are a central building block of future air combat. For the Netherlands, it is a way to get an early start on a major U.S. program compatible with their F-35 fleet. But this choice raises a major political question. By joining the U.S. CCA ecosystem, The Hague strengthens NATO interoperability. It also diminishes the urgency for a European equivalent. For European defense, the message is clear: the industrial lag in combat drones is becoming strategic.
The partnership between Washington and The Hague marks a concrete step forward
The U.S. Air Force and the Dutch Ministry of Defense have formalized a partnership to acquire and develop prototypes of Collaborative Combat Aircraft. The agreement places the Netherlands among the first international partners in the U.S. program. This is not merely an exchange of information. The Dutch are to contribute to the program with prototypes and participate in operational learning alongside the Americans.
The focal point is the Experimental Operations Unit, based at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada. This unit serves as a tactical laboratory. It is tasked with testing how combat drones can be integrated with piloted aircraft, then translating the results into operational concepts. This is an important detail. The CCA program is not just about buying a drone. It aims to learn how to use it in modern air warfare.
The Netherlands is therefore joining the program at the right time. They are not joining a rigid system. They are participating in its development. This position allows them to influence certain requirements, train their pilots in the use of collaborative drones, and prepare for the arrival of these capabilities in an air force already structured around the F-35.
The decision is also consistent with Dutch military culture. The Koninklijke Luchtmacht has chosen the F-35A. This choice is part of a strategy of deep integration with the United States and NATO. CCAs are designed to extend this strategy. They do not replace the piloted fighter. They make it harder to neutralize.
The CCA concept is based on a simple idea: adding mass without adding too many pilots
The principle of the Collaborative Combat Aircraft addresses a very concrete problem. Modern combat aircraft are becoming increasingly capable, but they are also becoming increasingly expensive.
An F-35 costs around $100 million depending on the batch and version, not including support, infrastructure, weaponry, and training costs. You also have to train a pilot, protect them, keep them proficient, and accept the political risk of a human casualty.
The CCA aims to break this equation. The idea is to produce jet-powered drones with advanced endurance, capable of flying alongside piloted aircraft. They must be powerful enough to accompany an F-35, yet affordable enough to be produced in large numbers. The initial U.S. goal called for a unit cost of about one-third that of an F-35, or around $30 to $35 million. U.S. Air Force officials have since indicated that estimates could be lower than this threshold, though final figures remain to be confirmed.
The logic here is not that of a disposable drone in the low-end sense. A CCA must not be a mere flying missile. It must be capable of carrying sensors, electronic warfare systems, and sometimes air-to-air or air-to-ground weapons, and operate with a certain degree of autonomy. It is, however, designed to accept a higher level of risk than a piloted aircraft.
This is what the Americans call affordable mass. In a conflict against a power with dense ground-to-air defenses, multiple radars, and modern fighters, sending only a few very expensive aircraft becomes dangerous. Adding drones allows for multiplying attack vectors, saturating radars, pushing sensors forward, and complicating the adversary’s calculations.
The F-35 Becomes the Conductor of a Controlled Swarm
The link with the F-35 is essential. The Netherlands already operates this American stealth aircraft. The F-35 is not just a fighter. It is a flying sensor. It combines AESA radar, electronic warfare, infrared detection, data fusion, and connectivity with other platforms. Its strength lies in its ability to see, understand, and share a tactical situation.
CCAs amplify this role. An F-35 can remain farther from the most dangerous zone while a drone moves in to detect a radar, jam a surface-to-air system, or draw fire. Another drone can carry additional missiles. A third can serve as a communication relay in a jammed environment. This division of labor is transforming air combat.
The pilot must not remotely control each drone as in a video game. That would be unrealistic. In a real mission, the pilot must already manage the aircraft, its sensors, weapons, fuel, communications, and threats. The CCA must therefore receive high-level orders: monitor an area, follow a flight path, engage a designated target, provide cover, jam a radar, or reposition.
The technical challenge is immense. It requires reliable endurance, jamming-resistant communications, robust cybersecurity, clear rules of engagement, and a simple interface for the pilot. It is also essential to ensure that humans retain control over lethal operations. The promise of the CCA holds true only if the system reduces the pilot’s cognitive load rather than increasing it.
U.S. prototypes provide a clear industrial lead
The U.S. program has already selected two manufacturers for Increment 1: General Atomics and Anduril Industries. General Atomics is developing the YFQ-42A. Anduril is developing the YFQ-44A. Both aircraft belong to a new category: jet-powered combat drones, designed from the outset to cooperate with piloted aircraft.
This choice is noteworthy. The U.S. Air Force did not limit itself to major historical players like Lockheed Martin, Boeing, or Northrop Grumman for this phase. It has bet on General Atomics, already a leader in military drones, and on Anduril, a newer company emerging from the U.S. tech ecosystem. The message is clear: Washington wants to accelerate and break certain traditional development cycles.
The U.S. Air Force has requested nearly $1 billion to begin purchasing the first CCA drones in 2027. It has also allocated approximately $1.3 billion in additional research and development funding for the same fiscal year. These figures indicate that the project is no longer merely experimental. It is moving into a phase of pre-production, initial batches, and then ramp-up.
The frequently cited goal is to exceed 100 drones initially, then to go much further if the doctrine proves successful. In some earlier U.S. statements, the idea of approximately 1,000 CCA eventually has been linked to the modernization of the U.S. Air Force. Even if this figure may change, it gives an indication of the scale of the ambition.
Europe must view this issue without naivety. The United States is not merely developing a drone. It is building an entire ecosystem: platforms, software, interfaces, doctrine, testing, training, an industrial supply chain, and future export partnerships.
The Dutch choice is rational, but it shifts the center of gravity toward the United States
For the Netherlands, the partnership makes sense. Their F-35 fleet will be more effective if it can operate with compatible drones. Their air force will gain in depth, survivability, and strike capability. Their industry may be able to secure a place in the development chain, at least for certain components, software, testing, or mission systems.
The Hague is also looking to learn quickly. In a Europe where major programs move slowly, joining the American initiative allows for concrete action. Timing matters. The war in Ukraine has shown the speed at which drones, electronic warfare, and distributed sensors are changing operations. Waiting until 2040 is no longer a sufficient strategy.
But this choice comes at a political cost. By joining the U.S. CCA ecosystem, the Netherlands further reinforces the central role of the F-35 in Europe. The continent already has numerous European users of this aircraft: the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Poland, Finland, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Romania, and Greece. This large user base creates a ripple effect. If U.S. collaborative drones become the natural extension of the F-35, European air forces will have a strong incentive to follow suit.
This is where the issue extends beyond the Netherlands. The U.S. CCA could become the de facto standard for European air forces equipped with F-35s. It could capture budgets, expertise, and doctrines before European projects reach maturity.
The risk for Europe is deeper technological dependence
European defense often speaks of strategic autonomy. The U.S.–Netherlands partnership highlights a less comfortable reality: in combat aviation, European autonomy recedes as soon as U.S. timelines move faster.
The Franco-German-Spanish SCAF also envisions escort drones, connected effectors, and a combat cloud. The GCAP program, led by the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan, is also working on a next-generation aerial system. But these projects are primarily aimed at the years 2035 to 2040. The American CCA, on the other hand, is already entering advanced prototype and procurement preparation phases.
The consequence is clear. European forces seeking combat drone capabilities before 2035 will look to the United States. They will not do so out of ideology. They will do so because the offering will be available sooner, compatible with the F-35, and supported by the U.S. Air Force.
This dynamic could weaken the European industry in three ways. First, it reduces the available market for European combat drones. Second, it forces European manufacturers to adapt to American architectures. Finally, it gives the United States an advantage in communication standards, autonomy, certification, and security.
The problem is not merely commercial. It is a matter of sovereignty. Whoever controls the software architecture, updates, data links, and mission libraries controls part of the freedom of operation.
European defense must stop confusing ambition with timing
This is the hardest lesson. Europe does not lack engineers. Nor does it lack money, especially since the increase in military budgets. It lacks speed, industrial discipline, and clear decisions.
The U.S. CCA is moving forward because the need is simply stated: to rapidly provide drones capable of increasing the combat mass around piloted aircraft. Europeans, on the other hand, tend to incorporate every issue into large, comprehensive programs. The SCAF is supposed to replace the Rafale and the Eurofighter, integrate drones, build a cloud, preserve national sovereignty, distribute industrial tasks, satisfy parliaments, prepare for exports, and accommodate manufacturers. This complexity slows everything down.
Europe should draw a clear conclusion from the partnership between Washington and The Hague. It cannot wait for the future fighter of 2040 to develop collaborative drones. It must fund intermediate programs right now. These systems could initially support the Rafale, the Eurofighter, the Gripen, or even the European F-35. They wouldn’t need to be perfect. Above all, they should be tested quickly, produced in small batches, improved through iterations, and handed over to the military to develop a doctrine.
The point is not to copy the United States. The point is not to let Washington alone define the next standard for air combat.
The European industrial challenge also lies in software
CCA drones are not just aircraft airframes. Their value lies in autonomy, data fusion, mission algorithms, cybersecurity, electronic warfare, and human-machine interfaces. This represents a major shift for the European defense industry, which has long been platform-centric.
A collaborative drone must understand its environment, classify threats, remain within a safety envelope, cooperate with other platforms, and continue its mission if communications are degraded. It must also be militarily certifiable. It is not enough to simply announce the use of artificial intelligence. It must be proven that the system is predictable, controllable, and usable within a chain of command.
The United States has a structural advantage here. Its ecosystem brings together major manufacturers, defense startups, venture capital, military laboratories, and large-scale procurement. Anduril exemplifies this shift. The company does not follow the traditional model of historic aircraft manufacturers. It represents a more software-driven, faster approach, closer to American tech culture.
Europe possesses strong capabilities, particularly in France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands. But these remain fragmented. Without clear direction, manufacturers cannot invest at the same pace. Without a common doctrine, the armed forces cannot specify the right systems. Without scale, costs remain high.
The Dutch partnership must wake up Paris, Berlin, and Brussels
The Dutch decision is not a betrayal of Europe. It is a wake-up call. The Netherlands is buying capability, experience, and time. They are following their operational logic. They are not going to wait for European industrial disputes to be resolved.
For Paris, the consequence is clear. France must accelerate its own work on collaborative combat drones, including outside the SCAF’s demanding schedule if necessary. The Rafale F5 and the combat drone intended to accompany it are an important response. But the pace must be maintained. France cannot criticize European dependence on the F-35 while allowing alternative capabilities to arrive too late.
For Berlin, the message is equally clear. Germany has chosen the F-35 for NATO’s nuclear mission. It will therefore remain exposed to the American ecosystem. If it wants to preserve a European industrial base, it must accept faster decisions on drones, software, and open architectures, rather than deferring everything to the complex balances of the SCAF.
For Brussels, the issue should become a priority. The European Defense Fund can support technological building blocks. But Europe needs a real procurement strategy. Demonstrators are not enough. We need production runs, even if limited. We need squadron-level testing. We need European standards for communication, control, and security. We must also accept the rapid failure of certain prototypes, rather than waiting fifteen years for a perfect program.
European air combat enters a make-or-break phase
The partnership between the United States and the Netherlands on CCA demonstrates where air warfare is headed. Superiority will no longer depend solely on the best fighter jet. It will depend on the ability to integrate manned aircraft, drones, sensors, jammers, missiles, satellites, and software into a coherent architecture.
The Netherlands has chosen to be in the inner circle of the United States. Militarily, this choice is defensible. Politically, it accelerates an already strong dependence. Industrially, it forces Europeans to confront their own slowness.
The real risk for Europe is not that American CCA systems will be effective. The real risk is that they will become indispensable before a credible European alternative exists. At that point, sovereignty will not be lost through some grand official renunciation. It will be lost through the accumulation of small, rational decisions, made country by country, aircraft by aircraft, software by software.
European defense still has a card to play. But it must move from rhetoric to production. Collaborative combat drones are no longer just a trade show concept. They are becoming a military capability. Those who write the standards over the next five years will also be shaping part of the balance of air power in the 2040s.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.