Taiwan presents Chiang Kung, a two-stage anti-ballistic system with national AESA radar and a range of up to 70 km, designed to counter Chinese missiles.
Summary
Taiwan has officially unveiled Chiang Kung (Strong Bow), a new two-stage anti-ballistic system, including an AESA radar produced on the island. The interceptor can engage targets at altitudes of up to 70 kilometers, which places it above the capabilities of existing systems such as the Tien Kung III (~45 km). This system complements current defenses against the growing threat of Chinese tactical ballistic missiles. A variant of Chiang Kung II with an even greater range (≈ 100 km) is currently under development.
The Chiang Kung system
The Chiang Kung system is distinguished by several major technical features:
- It is a two-stage interceptor: the first stage is used for initial launch and acceleration, while the second stage detaches and then uses its own smart millimeter wave seeker radar for the terminal pursuit phase.
- The system incorporates a large AESA radar, mounted on a towed truck, produced in Taiwan. This radar is used for initial detection or pre-launch guidance.
- The second-stage interceptor structure uses composite materials and offers thrust vectoring capability, i.e., the ability to direct thrust for maneuvering during flight.
- The claimed interception altitude reaches 70 kilometers (≈ 43 miles). This exceeds the maximum altitude of some systems currently in service, such as the Tien Kung III (~45 km).
- The system is “road-mobile,” meaning it is mounted on a trailer, which allows it to be moved. However, details are lacking on the time required to make it operational at a new site or after transport.
The strategic context: the Chinese threat and existing capabilities
Ballistic threat from China
- The Chinese army (PLA) has a large arsenal of tactical ballistic missiles (short-range ballistic missiles, SRBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles. These missiles can be launched from coastal provinces near the Taiwan Strait.
- According to analyses, China has approximately 900 short-range strategic missiles capable of targeting Taiwan, distributed across approximately 300 launchers.
- In addition, 370 mm guided rockets (PCH-191) can threaten the entire island from the mainland.
Taiwan’s current defense capabilities
- The Tien Kung III (Sky Bow III) system is already in service, capable of intercepting ballistic threats at altitudes of approximately 45 kilometers.
- Taiwan also has Patriot (US-made), PAC-3, and other systems that cover lower or final stages of interception, but with altitude ceilings often lower than those claimed for Chiang Kung.
- Taiwan’s inventory also includes cruise missiles such as Hsiung Feng III, which have anti-ship and medium-range land-to-land missions (≈ 100-150 km, some variants up to 400 km).
Technical comparison: Chiang Kung versus existing systems
| Element | Chiang Kung | Tien Kung III / Sky Bow III* | Patriot / PAC-3 etc. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maximum interception altitude | ≈ 70 km | ≈ 45 km | often ≤ 50 km for advanced versions |
| Guidance technologies / terminal phase | Millimeter wave radar, two stages | More conventional technology, terminal phase radar or infrared depending on version | Theoretically active radar for some PAC-3/MSE |
| Mobility | Mobile on trailer | Fixed or semi-mobile systems | Some mobile versions |
| Main radar | Domestic AESA mounted on truck | various radars, not necessarily domestic AESA | AESA or other radars depending on configuration, often imported |
This comparison shows that Chiang Kung could cross an important technical threshold for Taiwan in terms of high-altitude interception capabilities, which could allow ballistic threats to be dealt with earlier in their trajectory.
Technical uncertainties and limitations
- It is not known with certainty whether the Chiang Kung interceptor is a hit-to-kill type (destruction by kinetic impact) or whether it uses an explosive charge. The mode of destruction affects the type of targets that can be destroyed and the accuracy required.
- It is also unclear how far Chiang Kung can operate in the mid-course phase, when the warhead is outside the atmosphere. Although the altitude range is announced (70 km), the horizontal range or the ability to engage targets in low orbit or quasi-orbit is not confirmed.
- Reaction time and logistics remain unclear: how long does it take to deploy the system, make it operational, move it without exposure, resupply it, etc.? These elements are crucial in a missile barrage scenario.
- The complete origin of the equipment (radar, electronic components, software) is partially unknown. Even if the radar is said to be “domestically produced,” it is possible that foreign technologies have been transferred or acquired, which may pose vulnerabilities or dependencies.
Strategic consequences
Strengthening deterrence
The commissioning of Chiang Kung could change China’s strategic calculations regarding a ballistic attack on Taiwan. If Taiwan can intercept a significant number of tactical or quasi-tactical missiles at high altitude, this will:
- reduce the initial surprise effect or saturation effect of massive attacks
- increase the cost (in missiles and technological effort) for the adversary
- make certain trajectories or types of missiles less reliable for the attacker
Effect on the scale of weapons and budget
- Taiwan will have to invest not only in the production of interceptors but also in a network of radars, command centers, and maintenance.
- High-altitude interceptors are more expensive—manufacturing, materials, precision guidance—but their usefulness in a context of growing threat may justify the investment.
- At the same time, maintenance, mobility, and the dispersion of batteries to protect them from preemptive attacks become priorities, which increases logistical costs.
Operational risks and challenges
- In the event of a massive offensive, even high-performance systems can be overwhelmed, especially if the adversary plans to use decoys, multiple missiles, and saturation attacks.
- Radars, launchers, and command posts are likely to be targeted early in a conflict, so the survivability of installations is key—bunkers, dispersion, stealth, or mobility.
- If positions are not sufficiently dispersed or camouflaged, one or two well-targeted strikes could reduce overall effectiveness.
Projection: expected developments and regional implications
- Taiwan is already working on Chiang Kung II, with an announced vertical range of up to 100 kilometers, which would bring the system’s capabilities closer to those of exo-atmospheric interception systems.
- If the development of Chiang Kung II is confirmed, it could bring Taiwan closer to a level of defense comparable to certain advanced Israeli capabilities (such as Arrow) or certain layers of US missile defenses.
- This could lead to a regional arms race with China seeking to adapt its trajectories and missile types, increase the number of missiles, or develop evasion technologies (maneuverable warheads, hypersonic missiles, etc.).
- The US and its allies (Japan, South Korea) will be watching closely, both for material support and strategic consequences. The risk of escalation increases if the adversary sees this as a threat to its offensive capabilities.
Chiang Kung marks a major step forward in Taiwan’s anti-ballistic defense. Its strengths include high interception altitude, advanced guidance technology, and domestic components. However, its actual performance will depend on its ability to engage mid-range targets, its speed of deployment, and the robustness of its infrastructure against enemy strikes.
If Taiwan succeeds in deploying Chiang Kung effectively, it could call into question certain deterrence or ballistic attack strategies directed from mainland China. But there is no guarantee that it will be sufficient on its own: it remains necessary to maintain a multi-layered defense, combining active capabilities (interceptors, radars) and asymmetric capabilities (drones, electronic warfare, passive defense).
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.