After the failure of FCAS, Germany explores GCAP, Saab, and combat drones. Berlin seeks to preserve its industry and military influence in Europe.
Summary
Following the breakdown of the Franco-German FCAS program in June 2026, Germany is stepping up discussions to define the future of its combat aviation. On October 28, Airbus confirmed working with Berlin and Madrid on a new sixth-generation fighter project, while also studying a potential tie-up with GCAP, the British, Italian, and Japanese program. Simultaneously, Germany is accelerating the development of collaborative combat drones, notably with Airbus and American firm Kratos. Berlin has also committed to providing NATO with autonomous air-to-ground strike capabilities by 2035. This strategy opens several industrial avenues, but raises a central question: is Germany simply seeking to replace FCAS, or to take a dominant position in future European military technologies? The stakes extend beyond contract sharing; they concern intellectual property, software, combat architectures, and the continent’s strategic autonomy.
Germany seeks new partners after the failure of FCAS
On October 28, 2026, Guillaume Faury, CEO of Airbus, confirmed that the group was working with the German and Spanish governments on the future of a next-generation European fighter.
Berlin has notably initiated discussions with the countries participating in the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), developed by the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan.
This initiative comes four months after the cancellation of the New Generation Fighter (NGF), the piloted aircraft that formed the centerpiece of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS).
The Franco-German program, joined by Spain in 2019, was intended to develop an integrated system combining a stealth combat aircraft, escort drones, and a tactical communication network.
However, Dassault Aviation and Airbus never managed to resolve their differences over industrial leadership, workshare breakdown, and intellectual property.
Dassault claimed control over the fighter design. Airbus, representing German and Spanish interests, sought a more balanced sharing of responsibilities.
The cancellation of the NGF in June 2026 ultimately led Paris and Berlin to pursue different pathways. Cooperation on other components of FCAS, notably drones and the combat cloud, is nevertheless set to continue.
Alignment with GCAP could alter the European industrial balance
On October 26, Reuters reported that Airbus was preparing discussions with BAE Systems regarding potential participation in the GCAP program.
This program, launched in December 2022, brings together BAE Systems, Leonardo, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. It aims to field a sixth-generation stealth fighter by 2035.
The three countries formed the joint venture Edgewing, tasked with leading the design and development of the aircraft.
On October 28, Friedrich Merz, while traveling in Japan, confirmed that Germany was considering joining the program. The matter is set to be explored further during exchanges between the German and Japanese Defense Ministers.
However, Berlin is arriving late to a consortium whose industrial organization is already well advanced.
Technology sharing remains the main obstacle
Airbus wants German and Spanish industry to benefit from substantial participation in development work, production, and operational maintenance.
This request clashes with the interests of the founding members.
Leonardo considers that German participation could share development costs, but its chief executive Lorenzo Mariani warned that expanding the program risks compromising the 2035 deadline.
Japan also has its own requirements regarding technological security and export controls.
Germany cannot, therefore, automatically obtain a status equivalent to that of the three historical partners.
One scenario under study could limit its participation to escort drones, sensors, or the combat cloud, without granting it a central role in the aircraft’s core design.
German strategy multiplies technological partnerships
Berlin is not limiting its discussions to the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan.
In June 2026, Reuters reported that Airbus had also initiated exploratory exchanges with Sweden’s Saab.
Sweden retains significant national expertise thanks to the Saab JAS 39 Gripen and its ongoing work on autonomous systems.
In September 2026, Saab received a contract worth 2.9 billion Swedish kronor to continue studies on its future air combat system through 2028.
The company is notably developing demonstrators, stealth technologies, and architectures combining piloted aircraft with drones.
However, no agreement confirms Swedish participation in a German-led program.
Berlin also retains the option to purchase additional American F-35 Lightning II aircraft or launch its own industrial program.
This multiplication of options aligns with a negotiation logic: avoiding reliance on a single partner.
It also allows Germany to preserve a broader ambition: maintaining control over air combat technologies developed by its domestic industry.
Collaborative combat drones become a NATO priority
On October 30, the German Ministry of Defense confirmed its commitment to providing air-to-ground strike capabilities based on Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA).
NATO aims to possess these assets starting in 2035 to strike heavily defended targets.
These autonomous aircraft are intended to accompany piloted fighters, perform reconnaissance, jam enemy radars, or deliver munitions.
Their employment allows exposing platforms that are less costly than manned aircraft in hazardous environments.
The Airbus-Kratos Valkyrie clears a major hurdle
On October 12, 2026, Airbus announced the first European flight of its U740 Valkyrie, developed with American firm Kratos Defense & Security Solutions.
The aircraft measures 9.1 meters in length (29.9 ft), has a wingspan of 8.2 meters (26.9 ft), and features a maximum takeoff weight of approximately 3,000 kg (6,614 lb).
Airbus announces a range exceeding 5,000 km (3,107 mi) and an operational ceiling of 13,716 meters (45,000 ft).
During its first European trial, the drone conducted a rocket-assisted takeoff without a conventional runway, followed by maneuvers up to Mach 0.8.
Airbus plans to integrate its MARS software—Multiplatform Autonomous Reconfigurable and Secure—allowing autonomous mission management and coordination among multiple platforms.
The industrial objective is to offer an initial operational capability to the Luftwaffe as early as 2029, ahead of the deadlines set by NATO.
The Boeing-Rheinmetall partnership forms a competing offer
However, Airbus is not alone.
In March 2026, Rheinmetall and Boeing announced a cooperation aimed at offering the MQ-28 Ghost Bat to the German military.
Developed in Australia, this drone had already logged more than 150 test flights at the time of the partnership announcement.
Rheinmetall seeks to integrate German mission software, sensors, and armaments onto an existing airframe.
The company estimates that this program could generate several hundred million euros in business.
Berlin thus has two competing proposals built on the same principle: leveraging an American or Australian platform while developing part of the onboard intelligence in Germany.
Software control could grant Berlin a strategic advantage
The critical focus is no longer solely the airframe.
Future combat systems will rely on networks linking fighter jets, drones, satellites, ground-based radars, and air defense systems.
This architecture, termed the combat cloud, is designed to enable rapid data sharing and mission coordination.
For example, a fighter could receive information from a forward drone, pass a target designation to another aircraft, and engage a missile without using its own radar directly.
The system integrator thus plays a decisive role.
It controls the technical interfaces, software, and procedures allowing diverse equipment to function together.
Germany possesses strong industrial players in these domains: HENSOLDT for sensors, Diehl Defence for missiles, Rohde & Schwarz for communications, and MTU Aero Engines for propulsion.
In June 2026, eight industrial firms, including Airbus, formed Team Gen 6 to defend a German capability for developing a future fighter.
This strategy can be interpreted as a desire to exert greater control over the European technology chain.
However, it does not prove that Berlin seeks to appropriate its partners’ technologies. Intellectual property rights, licensing, and export controls strictly limit such possibilities.
France and Spain defend different interests
France has chosen to prepare a national program named the Avion de Combat Futur (ACF).
This successor to the Rafale will be required to execute conventional missions while preserving French capabilities for airborne nuclear deterrence and carrier-based operations.
The updated French military planning law of August 2026 notably confirms requirements tied to the future ASN4G missile and the aircraft carrier France libre.
These constraints explain why Paris refuses to relinquish control over the design of its aircraft.
Spain finds itself in a different position. It possesses a substantial aerospace industry, notably around Airbus Defence and Space, Indra, and ITP Aero, but does not independently possess all the requisite capabilities.
Madrid is therefore seeking a new international cooperation, while preserving the competencies acquired during FCAS.
As for Italy, it is not looking for a new program: it remains a founding partner of GCAP. Its main challenge consists of preserving its industrial position and timeline amidst additional candidacies.
Germany risks further fragmenting the European military industry
The German position presents a contradiction.
Berlin wishes to reinforce European strategic autonomy, yet simultaneously explores several solutions reliant on foreign platforms.
It considers GCAP, cooperates with Kratos and Boeing, negotiates with Saab, and retains the American F-35 option.
This strategy reduces the risk of another industrial failure, but it may also increase dependence on non-European technologies.
Developing domestic software on a foreign airframe does not automatically guarantee access to flight system source codes, design data, or export authorizations.
Similarly, joining an existing program does not mean participating in all decisions regarding its evolution.
The core issue is less about multiplying partnerships than defining which technologies Germany truly wishes to own and control.
The Franco-German rift opens a period of competition among several European projects, each defending its own industrialists, jobs, and military priorities.
Ultimately, this fragmentation could inflate development costs and reduce production volumes.
Berlin possesses major financial and industrial resources to weigh heavily in negotiations. But its ability to influence European military aviation will depend on concrete decisions: which programs to fund, which technologies to develop, and which partners to accept as true equals?
The risk is now clear. By attempting to participate in multiple combat architectures, Germany could preserve its industrial options without ever securing full control of a system. Europe, for its part, could end up with several competing sixth-generation fighters, even as its armed forces seek to enhance interoperability.