The GCAP is targeting 2035, but costs are rising and doubts are setting in. Japan is pushing for exports to prevent this highly ambitious program from becoming unsustainable.
In summary
The GCAP brings together Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy around a common goal: to field a new-generation fighter jet by 2035 intended to replace Japan’s F-2 and, on the European side, part of the post-Typhoon generation. On paper, the program is moving forward. The intergovernmental structure exists, the industrial organization has been established, and the official timeline has not been abandoned. In reality, the climate has grown more challenging. In Italy, the announced development budget has risen from €6 billion to €18.6 billion, a threefold increase compared to the 2021 projections. In Japan, concerns about deadlines have already been raised since 2025, to the point of fueling discussions about transitional solutions. At the same time, Tokyo is pushing for the export of the future aircraft, as without third-party customers, the business model becomes more fragile. The real issue, therefore, is not just cost. It is the GCAP’s ability to remain credible technologically, industrially, and politically through 2035.
The program that was supposed to prove a coalition could move faster
The Global Combat Air Programme was officially launched in December 2022 through the merger of the British Tempest program and the future Japanese F-X fighter, with Italy as the third pillar. The ambition is lofty: to produce an advanced air combat system centered on a new-generation manned aircraft, capable of rapid software updates, integration with unmanned effectors, and a high level of data fusion. The three governments have confirmed a target entry into service for 2035. This target is politically essential, especially for Japan, which must gradually replace its Mitsubishi F-2s starting around that time.
The project has taken shape. The intergovernmental treaty was signed in late 2023. The joint government headquarters was assigned to the United Kingdom. In 2024, the manufacturers BAE Systems, Leonardo, and JAIEC announced the creation of their joint venture, with equal ownership shares. This arrangement was intended to address a classic weakness of large multinational programs: too much politics, not enough industrial leadership. On paper, the GCAP thus sought to correct the errors that paralyze other European collaborations.
But moving faster as a coalition remains a promise that is easy to make but difficult to keep. An aircraft of this class is not merely a stealth airframe. It requires aligning military requirements, operational doctrines, sensor architectures, engines, critical software, assembly lines, safety regulations, and national industrial interests.
Every country wants sovereignty, local jobs, access to sensitive technologies, and a say in decision-making. This is exactly where timelines and costs start to spiral out of control.
The tripling of costs is real in Italy, but not yet documented for the entire program
We must be precise. As of March 28, 2026, what is solidly documented is not an officially consolidated tripling of the total overall cost of the GCAP for the three partners. What is confirmed, however, is the tripling of the Italian development estimate, which has risen from €6 billion in 2021 prices to €18.6 billion in current projections. Reuters reported this after the Italian Parliament gave the green light to €8.77 billion for the program’s initial phases through 2037. Defense News echoed the same development, citing the Italian Defense Minister.
This detail is crucial, as it changes the interpretation of the issue. To say that “GCAP costs have tripled” without qualification is an overstatement when referring to the entire program. To say that one of the three major partners has already seen its development bill triple is, however, accurate. And this fact alone is enough to raise the alarm. In a trilateral high-tech program, a cost explosion at one partner is never a purely national incident. It quickly becomes a collective problem. The other capitals must either match the effort, revise the scope, or accept greater dependence on imports.
Why this increase? The explanations offered are standard but valid: technological maturation, testing, integration, industrial cost inflation, and initial underestimation. This is the typical pattern for major air combat programs. A politically palatable budget is announced at the outset. Then technical reality catches up with everyone. A next-generation aircraft incorporates distributed sensors, secure data links, heavy onboard processing, a more open software architecture, and likely extensive integration with unmanned systems. Each layer adds risk and therefore cost.
The 2035 timeline remains official but is no longer a sure thing
Officially, the 2035 deadline still stands. Reuters noted as recently as December 2024 that the first aircraft was expected by that date. Manufacturers continue to cite this target. The problem is that an official timeline is no industrial guarantee. Reuters also reported as early as May 2025 that Japan harbored growing doubts about the program’s ability to meet this date, to the point of considering interim solutions, such as purchasing additional F-35s or extending the service life of existing aircraft.
This point highlights Tokyo’s specific vulnerability. The United Kingdom and Italy can absorb a schedule delay more flexibly, as their Typhoon fleets have a service life that can still be extended beyond 2035 in certain configurations. Japan, however, faces a more pressing need. Its F-2 is not simply an aging aircraft that can be kept for another ten years without consequence.
It is a central pillar of its posture vis-à-vis China. If the GCAP slips too far behind schedule, Tokyo risks a capability gap or a costly interim purchase from the United States.
We must therefore not downplay the “crisis reports” from late March. Even if they do not amount to formal confirmation of the program’s collapse, they reflect genuine nervousness. When a program must simultaneously defend its schedule, its funding, and its export model, it has already entered its risk zone.
Japan’s choice of export: no longer a bonus, but a condition for viability
The clearest point in Japan’s stance is this: selling the aircraft to third parties is no longer a diplomatic bonus; it is a key part of the financial equation. In March 2024, the Japanese government relaxed its rules on military equipment exports to allow overseas sales of the future fighter jet developed with London and Rome. Reuters noted at the time that this reform aimed to remove an obstacle that could have stalled the program. Sales to third countries remain restricted, particularly to states with defense agreements with Tokyo and outside active conflict zones, but the policy stance has shifted.
This is a major shift for Japan. For decades, its political and legal framework severely restricted arms exports. With the GCAP, Tokyo implicitly acknowledges a simple industrial reality: a next-generation fighter is too costly to remain economically viable if it relies solely on the domestic needs of the three partners. Larger production runs are needed. Development fixed costs must be spread out. The industrial base must also be reassured about future volumes.
The Japanese reasoning is blunt but logical. If the aircraft enters service around 2035, its commercial value will depend on its market window. The longer Tokyo waits to clarify export rules, the more time it loses to American competition and other 6th-generation projects. Hence this desire to accelerate not only the export doctrine, but also the accompanying industrial strategy. Defence News reported in March 2026 that Japan was seeking to advance these rules more quickly to give the program some breathing room despite financial and contractual tensions.
The trilateral difficulty that remains the real heart of the problem
The GCAP has often been presented as a more agile cooperation than the Franco-German-Spanish SCAF. This is partially true. Governance was planned earlier. The partners avoided certain leadership ambiguities. But this does not eliminate the deep-seated contradictions.
London wants to preserve a sovereign air combat industrial base centered on BAE Systems and the British technological ecosystem. Italy seeks to secure Leonardo’s role and remain at the heart of European aerospace high technology. Japan wants an aircraft available quickly, with credible access to sensitive technologies, without being held hostage to a schedule dictated by European timelines. These three approaches are not incompatible. They are simply costly to align.
Reuters reported in April 2025 on criticism from Italian Minister Guido Crosetto, who accused the United Kingdom of not fully sharing certain technologies with Italy and Japan. This type of friction is telling. As soon as one partner suspects another of withholding intellectual property or protecting its own interests, trust erodes. And when trust declines, costs rise even further, as each party seeks to duplicate capabilities or secure its own room for maneuver.
The GCAP is therefore not the victim of an isolated incident. It faces the structural problem common to all major multinational fighter aircraft programs: the more ambitious the system, the more central technological sovereignty becomes, and the more complicated cooperation gets. This requires quick trade-offs. Yet every trade-off upsets a partner.
The economic model that now requires thinking in terms of the market, not just sovereignty
Let’s be frank: an aircraft like the GCAP has virtually no chance of being financially viable if it remains confined solely to the British, Italian, and Japanese fleets. Even with significant combined requirements, the critical threshold for industrial profitability remains difficult to reach on such a complex platform. The partners therefore need a credible export market; otherwise, the program will turn into a sovereignty showcase paid for at a high price.
This is precisely why the idea of new entrants or associate customers regularly comes up in discussions. Reuters noted as early as 2024 that the joint industrial structure theoretically allowed for the entry of new participants. But opening the door to other countries is not a magic solution. Each new player brings potential volume, but also additional industrial, political, and security requirements. You gain potential revenue, but you often lose simplicity.
The central tension of the GCAP lies here: to remain financially viable, you must export. To export, you need a competitive product that is available on time and politically marketable. To keep these promises, tight governance and solid trust among partners are required. Yet it is precisely these last two points that become the most difficult to maintain as costs rise.
The test that will determine whether the GCAP is a true power program or an overly ambitious compromise
At this stage, the GCAP is neither doomed nor secure. It is moving forward, but under strain. The confirmed issues are already serious enough: a tripling of the Italian cost estimate, Japanese doubts about the schedule, an acknowledged need for exports, and dependence on trilateral cooperation that remains politically delicate.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect is not the exact final cost, which no one can honestly certify today. What is most interesting is what the current trajectory reveals. The GCAP shows that a next-generation fighter jet is no longer just a matter of aerodynamics, stealth, or engines. It is a test of governance, public funding, industrial strategy, and export acceptability.
If the trio manages to rein in cost overruns, protect the 2035 timeline, and open up a credible third-party market, the GCAP could emerge as the project that saved a sovereign capability from the standoff between Washington and Beijing. If costs continue to rise without rapid clarification on volumes and sales, the aircraft risks one day reaching the pinnacle of its technology but the nadir of its economics. And in combat aviation, this is how programs begin that are the most elegant on paper and the most vulnerable in real life.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.