The RAF aims to deploy CCA drones by 2030. Budget, missions, the Typhoon-F-35-GCAP fleet and the limitations of a highly ambitious timetable.
In summary
The Royal Air Force aims to have a collaborative combat aircraft demonstrator flying alongside a Eurofighter Typhoon by 2027, and to achieve operational capability before 2030. These unmanned aircraft will be tasked with detecting threats, jamming radars, carrying missiles and being the first to enter contested airspace. The UK is committing 300 million pounds between 2026 and 2030 to launch the programme. This sum can fund prototypes, autonomy systems, testing and initial integration. It cannot fund a full fleet. The future RAF is set to combine modernised Typhoons, the F-35A and F-35B, CCA aircraft and the future GCAP fighter, expected from 2035 onwards. The timetable is realistic for an initial, limited capability. It is far less so for an armed stealth aircraft, produced in large numbers and capable of operating from an aircraft carrier. Success will depend above all on the investments made after 2030.
The RAF aims to bring its schedule forward by nearly ten years
The Chief of the Air Staff of the Royal Air Force, Air Chief Marshal Harv Smyth, no longer wishes to wait for the Global Combat Air Programme to introduce the Collaborative Combat Aircraft into the British forces.
The announced timeline is ambitious. An operational concept demonstrator is set to fly alongside a Eurofighter Typhoon during the NATO Steadfast Defender exercise in 2027. An initial operational capability is then due to enter service before the end of the decade. Several successive generations of CCAs are to be developed before the arrival of the future GCAP combat aircraft.
The UK’s Defence Investment Plan was less specific. It set an official target of a flying demonstrator by 2030 at the latest. Harv Smyth is therefore bringing forward the timeline by around three years for testing and by nearly a decade compared with the previous scenario, which mainly linked autonomous aircraft to the GCAP’s entry into service in the mid-2030s.
This acceleration is based on a simple observation. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that traditional military development cycles are too slow. A conventional aeronautical programme can take fifteen to twenty years from the definition of the requirement to entry into service. Meanwhile, software, sensors, jamming capabilities and drone tactics evolve within a matter of months.
The RAF is therefore not seeking a perfect aircraft from the very first version. It aims to develop a minimum capability, test it in exercises, modify it, and then produce new configurations through short development cycles. Harv Smyth advocates an approach based on incremental development and rapid failure. The aim is to correct errors before they are incorporated into a costly fleet.
This method breaks with the usual culture of major British programmes. It involves technical risks. Nevertheless, it is consistent with the software-based nature of CCAs, whose value will depend as much on their autonomy and connectivity as on their aerodynamic performance.
The CCA must become much more than a simple escort drone
The autonomous system will be assigned a mission rather than being under constant remote control
A Collaborative Combat Aircraft is not a drone that is constantly remotely piloted from a ground station. It is an unmanned aircraft capable of collaborating with piloted fighter jets, other drones, surveillance aircraft and command centres.
The Typhoon pilot must not direct every movement of the CCA in the same way that an operator controls a conventional aircraft. Instead, they must assign it a task: to reconnoitre an area, search for a radar, jam a frequency, track a target or position itself to launch a missile.
The autonomous system must then manage aspects of navigation, separation between aircraft, threat avoidance and the use of sensors. This autonomy is essential. A pilot engaged in aerial combat cannot simultaneously fly four drones using individual controls.
Communications may also be jammed or interrupted. The CCA will have to continue a mission under degraded conditions without receiving continuous instructions. It will have to adhere to geographical limits, rules of engagement and safety criteria defined prior to the flight.
For lethal actions, human responsibility will remain central. Autonomy may suggest a target, optimise a flight path or prepare for an engagement. Authorisation to use a weapon must, however, remain in accordance with UK regulations and the law of armed conflict.
Missions will be divided amongst several specialised aircraft
The RAF does not appear to be seeking a single model capable of doing everything. Instead, it is moving towards a family of platforms and payloads.
A first CCA could fly at the front of the formation to detect radar emissions. A second could use a jammer to mask the Typhoon’s approach. A third could carry additional air-to-air missiles. A fourth would serve as a communications relay. A fifth could mimic the signature of a fighter to force the enemy to reveal its radars or waste its interceptors.
This combination would form an affordable combat force. The term ‘affordable’, however, is relative. The CCA must not be regarded as disposable. Whilst it may be accepted that it is exposed to greater risks than a manned aircraft, its loss must not be economically insignificant.
The model is only viable if the aircraft costs significantly less than a Typhoon or an F-35. If the CCA is fitted with a high-performance engine, advanced stealth capabilities, a sophisticated radar, secure communications and multiple weapons, its price can quickly approach that of a light fighter.
The UK will therefore have to strike a balance between performance and numbers. A CCA designed for jamming does not necessarily require the same capabilities as an aircraft tasked with penetrating deep into enemy airspace.
The Defence Investment Plan lists four main missions: air defence, strike, intelligence and electromagnetic attack. It also specifies that autonomous aircraft will need to extend sensor coverage, carry additional missiles and operate well ahead of manned aircraft.
The Typhoon will become the centre of a distributed combat system
Harv Smyth believes that a group comprising four to five UCAVs could lead a Eurofighter Typhoon during the 2030s.
The Typhoon would remain at a distance from enemy defences. Its pilot would receive information gathered by the autonomous aircraft, assign missions and coordinate engagements. He would act less like the isolated pilot of a fighter and more like the manager of an air combat network.
The RAF states that this combination could transform the Typhoon into a combat system almost on a par with a fifth-generation capability. This concept should be viewed with caution.
The CCA will not make the Typhoon’s airframe stealthy. They will not reduce its radar signature. However, they can prevent it from exposing itself directly. A jamming drone can degrade the enemy’s detection capabilities. An advanced sensor can provide a target’s coordinates without the Typhoon having to switch on its own radar. A missile carrier can launch a weapon from a more favourable position.
Physical stealth is thus partially replaced by dispersion, jamming, cooperation and safe distance. This is the principle of the system of systems.
BAE Systems is already working on ways to control UCAVs from the Typhoon. The future panoramic display planned as part of the Long-Term Evolution modernisation programme could show the pilot the position of autonomous aircraft, their status, their sensors and available missions.
The main challenge will be managing the cognitive load. Simply displaying five drones is not enough. The system must prioritise information and avoid turning the pilot into an air traffic controller. The autonomous system will need to filter the data and present only the important decisions.
The UK already has initial experience with StormShroud. This drone, equipped with the BriteStorm electronic warfare system, entered service in 2025. It can jam or deceive enemy radars to protect Typhoons and F-35Bs. Several drones were subsequently deployed simultaneously during the 2025 trials.
StormShroud is not a jet-powered CCA comparable to the future aircraft under consideration. It nevertheless demonstrates that the RAF can rapidly introduce a specialised autonomous platform. Its initial development took around one year and cost 19 million pounds.
The future fleet will combine four generations of combat aircraft
The Typhoon will remain indispensable until the 2040s
The UK does not plan to abruptly replace its Eurofighters with the GCAP. Harv Smyth calls for a genuine overlap between the two programmes in order to avoid a drop in capability.
The RAF had 95 Typhoons in its front-line fleet in June 2026. These aircraft include those currently available and those undergoing short-term maintenance. The 67 Tranche 2 aircraft and the 40 Tranche 3 aircraft form the long-term backbone of the fleet, whilst the older Tranche 1 aircraft are being phased out.
The Defence Investment Plan allocates £5.4 billion to the Typhoon between the financial years 2026–2027 and 2029–2030. Of this sum, more than 1.1 billion is to fund upgrades and the maintenance of the aircraft into the 2040s.
The modernisation includes, in particular, the ECRS Mk2 active phased array radar, new electronic warfare capabilities, an upgraded computer, a redesigned cockpit and improved connectivity. Forty ECRS Mk2 radars are to be produced under a contract valued at 453 million pounds.
The modernised Typhoon will thus become the UK’s first CCA command platform. This role could extend its relevance far beyond what a limited modernisation of its weapons and radar would have allowed.
The F-35 will be required to carry out land-based, naval and nuclear missions
The United Kingdom has taken delivery of the 48 F-35Bs from its first order. As one aircraft was lost in 2021, the remaining fleet comprises 47 aircraft.
A second tranche of 27 aircraft is set to bring the total ordered to 75, representing a planned fleet of 74 aircraft after accounting for the loss. It will comprise 15 additional F-35Bs and 12 F-35As.
The F-35B is capable of short take-off and vertical landing. It remains indispensable to the aircraft carriers HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales. The F-35A cannot operate from these vessels. However, it offers greater range, a higher payload and a generally lower acquisition cost.
The twelve F-35As are intended to enable the UK to join NATO’s airborne nuclear mission. They will be able to deploy the US B61 nuclear bomb as part of the Alliance’s nuclear sharing arrangement. Deliveries are not expected to begin until the early 2030s, however.
The new Combat Air Strategy will need to define the future mix of F-35A and F-35B aircraft. This decision will directly determine the size of the carrier-based air group and the requirements of the nuclear mission.
The CCA could improve the effectiveness of both variants. However, its integration into the F-35 is likely to be more complex than its integration with the Typhoon. The F-35 relies on a multinational programme, US software and highly controlled modernisation cycles.
Harv Smyth has, moreover, criticised the slow pace of integrating British weapons onto the F-35. The RAF will have to temporarily use the US-made Small Diameter Bomb II whilst awaiting the integration of the British Spear 3 missile. This difficulty serves as a warning: flying a CCA alongside an F-35 is relatively simple, but actually integrating it with the F-35’s sensors, data links and mission system is much more difficult.
The GCAP will have to resume its central role from 2035
The Global Combat Air Programme brings together the United Kingdom, Italy and Japan. It aims to produce a new-generation fighter aircraft capable of gradually replacing the British and Italian Typhoons as well as the Japanese Mitsubishi F-2s.
The official target remains entry into service in 2035. However, full operational capability is expected to be achieved during the second half of the 2030s.
The UK is allocating 8.6 billion pounds to the GCAP between 2026–2027 and 2029–2030. Around 2.7 billion had already been spent since 2024 at the time of the publication of the Defence Investment Plan.
The CCA launched today is therefore not a competitor to the GCAP. It is intended to prepare its operational environment. The autonomy software, communications, mission control and integration methods tested with the Typhoon can be adapted for the future aircraft.
This continuity is essential. A CCA developed as a stand-alone programme would risk becoming obsolete as soon as the GCAP arrives. Instead, the UK aims to build an open architecture in which autonomous platforms can be replaced without having to rebuild the entire combat system.
The £300 million budget funds only the initial phase
The Defence Investment Plan commits £300 million to the CCA programme between 2026–2027 and 2029–2030.
This sum can fund the requirements definition, several demonstrators, the development of autonomy software, payloads, flight tests and an initial integration with the Typhoon. It can also enable several manufacturers to put forward competing solutions.
It is not enough to fund a fully-fledged fleet.
By way of comparison, the US Air Force had already allocated nearly 1.91 billion dollars to the development of its CCA since 2024. Its budget request for the 2027 financial year stood at approximately 2.37 billion dollars, of which nearly one billion was earmarked for the start of production. The US target is for more than 150 operational aircraft by 2030 and around 1,000 in the longer term.
This comparison does not mean that the UK must replicate the US programme exactly. It does, however, highlight the gap between funding for a trial and funding for a mass-produced military capability.
The UK budget of 300 million pounds represents around 3.5 per cent of the funding allocated to the GCAP over the same period. It should therefore be regarded as a seed fund.
To equip each fighter squadron, maintain reserve aircraft, build up stocks of spare parts and integrate weapons, the UK will probably need to commit several billion more during the 2030s. It will also be necessary to fund infrastructure, simulators, technical teams, secure communications and in-service support.
The Defence Investment Plan provides for at least 70 billion pounds for new air capabilities between 2030 and 2035. This budget has not yet been allocated on a programme-by-programme basis. It is during this period that the actual funding for the CCA fleet will need to be finalised.
Budgetary uncertainty remains significant. The plan provides for £298 billion in defence spending between 2026–2027 and 2029–2030. Of the additional £15 billion announced, the funding arrangements for £4.7 billion are yet to be confirmed in the 2026 budget.
The CCA will therefore have to compete for funding with the GCAP, the F-35s, munitions, missile defence, nuclear submarines and infrastructure modernisation.
Operations from aircraft carriers will be the most challenging
The RAF and the Royal Navy ultimately aim to operate the CCAs from land-based bases and Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers.
This aspect is technically ambitious. British aircraft carriers have neither catapults nor arresting wires. They are designed for the F-35B, which is capable of short take-off and vertical landing.
The VANQUISH project aims to demonstrate an autonomous jet aircraft capable of taking off and landing on an aircraft carrier without the installation of an assisted launch and recovery system. An on-board demonstration is planned for the near future.
The challenge is not limited to flight. The aircraft must be moved around the deck, refuelled, its equipment loaded, maintained and operated in a salty environment. Interference between its communications and those of the carrier strike group must also be avoided.
A short take-off and landing (STOL) CCA may be a realistic prospect. A heavy, stealthy and heavily armed aircraft will be much more difficult to recover without a catapult or arresting wire. Vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) capability would increase weight, complexity and cost.
Meanwhile, the Royal Navy is allocating nearly 250 million pounds to the PANTHEON project, aimed at developing a hybrid carrier-based air group. This budget is separate from the 300 million allocated to the RAF’s CCA programme. It is essential that the two initiatives are coordinated to avoid funding incompatible platforms.
The timetable is realistic for a demonstrator, but not yet for the announced fleet
Flying a CCA alongside a Typhoon in 2027 is a credible prospect, provided the expected outcome is clearly defined.
The UK already has unmanned aircraft, jamming systems, expertise in artificial intelligence and simulators to prepare for cockpit control. A credible demonstrator can therefore be developed from an existing platform or one that can be rapidly adapted.
An initial operational capability before 2030 is also possible, provided it remains specialised. An aircraft for electronic warfare, reconnaissance, relay or threat simulation could enter service quickly.
The situation becomes much more uncertain if the RAF intends to have, by 2030, a stealthy, armed, jamming-resistant CCA that is compatible with the F-35, capable of operating with degraded autonomy and deployable from an aircraft carrier.
These capabilities require extensive testing. Software must be certified, communications secured, weapons integrated, propulsion systems tested and checks carried out to ensure that the autonomous system does not pose a danger to piloted aircraft.
The concept of four or five UAVs accompanying each Typhoon is an operational ambition, not yet a fleet plan. If it were applied simultaneously to a significant proportion of the 95 Typhoons in the front-line fleet, it would require several hundred CCA aircraft. The government is currently providing neither a target quantity, nor a unit price, nor a production timetable.
The approach is therefore realistic in stages. It is not yet realistic as a complete programme.
The RAF can achieve a usable capability before 2030. By that date, it will probably not have the full system described by Harv Smyth. The real challenge will be to resist the temptation to overload the first aircraft with too many missions.
Success will depend more on the network than on the aircraft
The British project addresses a genuine weakness. The RAF has high-performance aircraft, but its fleet remains small relative to the needs of territorial defence, NATO commitments, operations in the Middle East and the protection of aircraft carriers.
UAVs can increase the number of sensors, jammers and missiles available without having to purchase as many manned fighters. They can also deploy aircraft where sending a crew would be considered too risky.
But their effectiveness will not be determined by a futuristic design. It will depend on the resilience of communications, the quality of endurance, the speed of software updates and the ability to produce the aircraft in large numbers.
The RAF will not become a sixth-generation force simply by adding drones to its squadrons. It will become one if the Typhoons, F-35s, CCA, radar aircraft, refuelling aircraft, satellites and weapons can genuinely share information and fight as a coherent whole.
The UK has now funded the start of this transformation. It has not yet funded its completion.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.