Greenland is at the heart of Arctic defence, missile early warning, critical minerals and allied sovereignty. A crisis at the heart of NATO.
In summary
Greenland is not some distant island caught up in an exotic territorial dispute. It is a key Arctic defence stronghold, a forward missile warning sensor, a space surveillance platform and a matter of sovereignty within NATO itself. At the Alliance’s summit in Ankara, Donald Trump reignited a deep-seated tension by asserting that the United States should control Greenland. Denmark and Greenland have rejected this idea. The issue is simple: Washington already has strategic military access via Pituffik Space Base, formerly Thule Air Base. Demanding control over an autonomous territory under the Kingdom of Denmark therefore seems less like an operational necessity than a means of exerting pressure on an ally. This is dangerous for NATO, as the Alliance upholds a central principle: the sovereignty of its member states. Greenland is testing this consistency at a time when Russia and China are bolstering the military significance of the Arctic.
Greenland has become a defence issue rather than a territorial one
The debate over Greenland is often framed incorrectly. It is not simply a question of whether the United States wants to buy, control or influence an island. The real issue runs much deeper. Greenland lies at the crossroads of four strategic issues: Arctic defence, early warning against missiles, space surveillance and access to critical minerals.
This is what makes the issue so explosive within NATO. Greenland is an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark. Denmark is a founding member of the Atlantic Alliance. Consequently, any US pressure regarding control of Greenland directly affects the sovereignty of an ally. This is not a legal technicality. It is the political crux of the matter.
In Ankara, Donald Trump reiterated that Greenland should be controlled by the United States rather than by Denmark. The Danish response was unequivocal. Mette Frederiksen reiterated that Greenland was not for sale and that the Greenlanders did not wish to become American. The Greenlandic Prime Minister, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, also rejected the repeated calls for control over or annexation of the territory.
The problem for Washington is that whilst the military argument exists, it does not automatically justify the territorial argument. The United States is right to regard Greenland as strategic. It is wrong to present political control over it as a prerequisite for its security. It is precisely this confusion that is creating a rift within NATO.
Greenland’s status places sovereignty at the heart of the debate
Greenland enjoys a regime of extensive autonomy. The Self-Government Act recognises the Greenlandic people as a people with the right to self-determination under international law. The territory has its own parliament, the Inatsisartut, and its own government, the Naalakkersuisut. It can exercise numerous internal powers, including in the field of mineral resources.
However, defence, security and foreign policy remain the responsibility of the Kingdom of Denmark. This structure creates a delicate situation. Greenland is autonomous, but it is not an independent state. Denmark remains responsible for key strategic matters. The United States must therefore deal with both Copenhagen and Nuuk. It cannot bypass one in favour of the other without creating a crisis.
The figures also highlight the disproportion between the territory’s size and its geopolitical significance. Greenland covers approximately 2.2 million square kilometres. More than 80 per cent of its surface area is covered by the ice cap or glaciers. Its population stands at around 56,000 to 57,000. Few territories with such a small population attract so much military, space and industrial attention.
It is this disparity that fascinates Washington. But it also calls for extreme caution. Greenland is not an empty space. It is an inhabited, politically organised territory with a strong identity and a right to determine its own future. To forget this would be a strategic and moral error.
Greenland’s geographical position controls access to the Arctic
Greenland is important because it is in the right place. It lies between North America, the Arctic Ocean and the North Atlantic. It borders one of the Western world’s most sensitive military corridors: the GIUK gap, standing for Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom.
This passage is not an abstract Cold War concept. It is a maritime and air corridor that allows the movements of submarines, ships, aircraft and missiles to be tracked between the Russian Arctic, the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic. For NATO, monitoring the GIUK gap is tantamount to protecting the lines of communication between North America and Europe.
In the event of a major crisis with Russia, this corridor would once again become crucial. American reinforcements heading for Europe would have to cross the Atlantic. Russian submarines from the Northern Fleet would seek to break out of their Arctic strongholds or threaten undersea cables, ports, convoys and critical infrastructure. Greenland, Iceland, the United Kingdom and Norway would then form a surveillance chain.
Russia maintains a large proportion of its second-strike nuclear capabilities in the Kola Peninsula region. According to Reuters, this area accounts for around two-thirds of Russia’s relevant capabilities, including a significant proportion of its ballistic missile submarines. This is a crucial fact. The Arctic is not merely a region of sea routes. It is one of the theatres of nuclear deterrence.
The Pituffik base already provides the United States with essential strategic access
The most important point is often overlooked. The United States does not need to own Greenland to operate militarily there. It already has Pituffik Space Base, formerly Thule Air Base. This is the US Department of Defence’s northernmost military installation.
Pituffik Space Base is not a secondary base. It supports missile warning, missile defence and space surveillance missions. Its active-scanning radar, operated by the 12th Space Warning Squadron, helps detect threats from intercontinental ballistic missiles and sea-launched ballistic missiles. It also contributes to the surveillance of objects in orbit.
Pituffik’s role is therefore twofold. Firstly, the base scans the sky to detect missile launches. Secondly, it monitors space to track satellites, debris and orbital objects of interest to US and allied security. In an era where military operations rely on satellites for communications, navigation, intelligence and early warning, this function is crucial.
The base exists thanks to defence agreements between the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark. This is precisely what undermines the argument that the US exercises control over the territory. Washington already has what it needs militarily: a presence, access, radar, a port, a runway, infrastructure and cooperation. Anything that might be lacking can be negotiated. There is no need to call into question Danish sovereignty or Greenlandic self-determination.
Russia is restoring a hard military role to the Arctic
Russia has transformed the Arctic into a priority military theatre. NATO believes that Moscow has stepped up its activity in the region, established an Arctic command, reopened former Soviet sites and developed infrastructure such as airfields and deep-water ports. Russia’s rationale is clear. The Arctic protects its nuclear submarines, opens up routes to the Atlantic and provides a space for long-range projection.
Climate change is reinforcing this dynamic. The partial melting of the ice makes certain routes more accessible for part of the year. It does not turn the Arctic into a straightforward maritime highway. Conditions remain extreme. But it is enough to alter military and economic calculations. Navies must step up surveillance. Radar coverage must be expanded. Satellites are becoming indispensable. Submarine cables are becoming more vulnerable.
Russia also has a concrete advantage: its fleet of icebreakers. Reuters has reported that Russia has 42 operational icebreakers, whilst the United States has only two. This figure sums up the gap in Arctic preparedness. A presence in the Far North cannot be simply decreed. It requires suitable vessels, ports, trained crews, communications capable of withstanding high latitudes, and rescue capabilities.
This is where Greenland becomes essential. It enables surveillance to be extended, logistics to be supported, Russian movements to be tracked, and a Western presence to be maintained in an environment where every kilometre counts.
China adds an industrial and maritime dimension
China has no Arctic territory. However, since 2018 it has described itself as a ‘near-Arctic state’. Whilst this characterisation is politically debatable, it does reflect a reality: Beijing wants to participate in the region’s economic opening.
Its interests are manifold. China is looking at sea routes, energy resources, critical minerals, cables, ports and research stations. It also seeks to prevent the Arctic from becoming an area strictly controlled by the United States and its allies. For Beijing, Greenland could become an economic gateway to a region where strategic competition is set to continue.
NATO now views this Chinese presence with caution. The Alliance emphasises that Beijing is seeking access to energy, critical minerals and maritime communication routes. It also notes that cooperation between Russia and China has strategic and operational implications for the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture.
Here again, the issue is not imaginary. China dominates a significant part of the rare-earth processing chains. Even when a deposit is located outside China, its exploitation may depend on technologies, capital or processing agreements linked to Chinese actors. Greenland is therefore becoming a matter of industrial security, not just military geography.
Critical minerals add a strategic layer to the issue
Greenland possesses significant mineral resources: rare earths, graphite, tungsten, zinc, copper, gold, vanadium, palladium and other strategic materials. Rare earths attract the most attention. They are essential for permanent magnets, radar, electric motors, batteries, guidance systems, missiles and defence electronics.
According to the CSIS, Greenland ranks eighth in the world for rare-earth reserves, with approximately 1.5 million tonnes. Two projects are the focus of attention: Kvanefjeld and Tanbreez. Kvanefjeld is said to have more than 11 million tonnes of rare-earth resources and reserves, including around 370,000 tonnes of heavy rare earths. Tanbreez is described as a potentially major deposit, with an estimated 28.2 million tonnes of resources.
These figures are considerable. But they are not enough to create an industry. Greenland remains a challenging environment. The cold, remoteness, lack of infrastructure, environmental sensitivities, energy constraints and social acceptability are holding projects back. The territory does not yet have any large-scale rare earth mining operations.
Yet this is where part of the future is at stake. Western militaries want to reduce their dependence on value chains dominated by China. Greenland can help. But this requires patient, transparent investment that respects Nuuk. An effective Western strategy cannot consist of replacing dependence on China with American pressure.
The diplomatic problem stems from the American approach
The American position contains a strategic truth and a diplomatic error. The truth is that Greenland is important to the security of the United States, NATO and the Arctic. The mistake is to act as if this importance justifies a claim to control.
In an alliance, words matter. When the leading NATO member speaks of controlling a territory belonging to another member, it undermines the collective message. NATO claims to defend sovereignty, territorial integrity and the rejection of changes imposed by force. This has been at the heart of the Alliance’s stance towards Russia since the invasion of Ukraine. If Washington appears to play down these principles when dealing with a smaller ally, Moscow gains a propaganda talking point.
Denmark understands the US military’s interests. So does Greenland. Discussions on a strengthened US presence are not out of the question. Mette Frederiksen herself has reiterated that Denmark wishes to cooperate more closely with the United States on the defence of the High North. Lars Løkke Rasmussen has raised the possibility of expanding the 1951 defence agreement whilst respecting the Kingdom’s red lines.
A realistic path therefore already exists. It involves a tripartite agreement between Washington, Copenhagen and Nuuk. It could include more surveillance, more radar systems, more infrastructure, more emergency response capabilities, greater cooperation on critical minerals and a stronger allied presence. It does not require rhetoric about taking control.
The Greenland crisis tests NATO’s cohesion
The Ankara summit was intended to demonstrate the Alliance’s unity. The issue of Greenland had the opposite effect. It served as a reminder that NATO is not only threatened by its adversaries; it can also be weakened by contradictions amongst its members.
The Alliance’s message is simple: every centimetre of allied territory must be defended. Mette Frederiksen echoed this idea by stating that Denmark was ready to defend every centimetre of NATO, including the Kingdom of Denmark. This language is deliberate. It places Greenland in the same category as the Baltic states, Norway, Poland and Finland. Allied territory is non-negotiable under pressure.
The difficulty is that the United States remains indispensable to Arctic defence. Pituffik, NORAD, US space capabilities, submarines, satellites and maritime patrol aircraft form a central part of the Western security architecture. Europe cannot simply say no to Washington and ignore US needs. But Washington cannot call for allied solidarity in the face of Russia whilst at the same time sending the signal that an ally can be subjected to territorial pressure.
It is this tension that makes Greenland so important. It highlights a broader question: is NATO merely an alliance of military capabilities, or does it remain an alliance of political principles?
Arctic rearmament is the real answer to the problem
If the United States wishes to strengthen Greenland’s security, the serious answer is not a territorial claim. It is investment. NATO launched Arctic Sentry in February 2026 to better coordinate allied activities in the Far North. The initiative aims to give Alliance planners greater visibility over national actions in the region and to integrate them into a coherent operational approach.
This approach is more useful than provocative statements. The need is clear: more satellites, long-endurance drones, radars, frigates, submarines, icebreakers, communications equipment suited to high latitudes, and underwater sensors. Reuters has cited estimates suggesting that the necessary investment could run into several hundred billion dollars. This figure may seem high, but it is credible when considering a comprehensive Arctic posture spanning several decades.
Europe must also play its part. Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Canada, the United Kingdom, Finland and Sweden have a direct role to play in the defence of the North. The return of Finland and Sweden to a framework fully integrated with NATO changes the strategic landscape. The Baltic, the High North and the North Atlantic are becoming a single theatre of defence.
Greenland must be treated as a linchpin of this architecture. Not as a territorial trophy.
Greenlandic sovereignty has become a strategic asset
Therein lies the paradox. What makes Greenland valuable to the West is not just its location, its radar systems or its mineral resources. It is also its political legitimacy. A Greenland that is respected, involved in decision-making and benefiting from Western investment strengthens NATO. A Greenland that is humiliated or treated as a bargaining chip weakens it.
Russia and China are watching this crisis unfold.
They do not need to provoke a formal rift within the Alliance. It is enough for them to exploit the contradictions. If NATO wishes to defend Ukrainian sovereignty but tolerates ambiguous rhetoric regarding the sovereignty of an allied territory, its message loses its force. If the United States wishes to contain China in the Arctic but offends Nuuk and Copenhagen, it complicates its own strategy.
Greenland is therefore a test. It forces Washington to choose between two approaches. The first is that of pressure: spectacular but counterproductive. The second is that of partnership: slower but more robust. In the Arctic, the second option is the only viable one. Radars, mines, ports and bases are not enough. What is needed is the political trust that allows them to be used sustainably.
Greenland is not merely a strategic island. It is NATO’s mirror in the Far North. It shows whether the Alliance is still capable of defending its interests without trampling on its own principles.
Sources
Reuters — Trump reiterates at NATO summit that Greenland should be controlled by the US, not Denmark.
Reuters — Denmark ready to defend every inch of NATO, including the Danish kingdom, says Prime Minister.
Reuters — Trump says there is a great deal of unity at the NATO summit after criticising allies.
Le Monde — Danish Prime Minister to Trump: Greenland has been very clear – it does not want to be part of the US.
US Space Force / Peterson & Schriever Space Force Base — Pituffik Space Base mission and units.
Prime Minister’s Office of Denmark — Greenland and the Self-Government Act.
NATO — Arctic security topic page.
Reuters — NATO allies promised Trump they’d secure the Arctic; they’ve got work to do.
Associated Press — Why Trump covets Greenland.
CSIS — Greenland, Rare Earths, and Arctic Security.
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