Patriot, THAAD, Tomahawk, SM-3, SM-6 and AMRAAM missiles: Washington is pressing its defence contractors to replenish stocks depleted by conflicts.
In summary
Washington is now asking major US defence contractors to produce missiles as if a major war were imminent. Operations in the Middle East, deliveries to Ukraine and the needs of allies have depleted stocks of Tomahawk, Patriot, THAAD and several naval missiles. According to public estimates, the US campaign against Iran is thought to have used up more than 1,000 Tomahawks, up to 290 THAAD interceptors and more than 1,100 JASSM missiles. The Pentagon therefore wants to ramp up production rates: around 2,000 PAC-3 MSEs per year, 400 THAAD units, over 1,000 Tomahawks, 1,900 AMRAAMs and over 500 SM-6s. But an announcement does not build a factory. Rocket motors, guidance systems, propellants, electronic components and skilled personnel remain difficult to produce. The US problem is less a shortage of money than a shortage of industrial capacity.
A succession of conflicts reveals a long-hidden weakness
On 15 July 2026, Donald Trump was due to use a summit organised at the U.S. Army War College in Pennsylvania to call on defence industry leaders to ramp up weapons production.
The message was not new. It had simply become more urgent.
A few weeks earlier, the White House had already brought together executives from Lockheed Martin, RTX, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, General Dynamics, L3Harris Technologies, BAE Systems and Honeywell Aerospace. Representatives from the Pentagon had explained to them that the progress announced was not enough.
The statement reported after the meeting was blunt: “You’re not doing enough.”
The war in Ukraine had already exposed the sluggishness of the US defence industrial base. The United States had been forced to ramp up production of 155-millimetre shells, GMLRS rockets, Javelin anti-tank missiles, Stinger missiles and Patriot systems.
Operations against the Houthis in the Red Sea subsequently used up air defence missiles and naval strike weapons. Support for Israel mobilised additional interceptors. Finally, the US campaign against Iran placed much greater strain on stocks.
The Centre for Strategic and International Studies estimates that the campaign against Iran struck more than 12,000 targets. It is reported to have used more than 1,000 Tomahawk missiles, up to 290 THAAD interceptors and more than 1,100 JASSM missiles.
These figures remain estimates. The Pentagon does not publish the exact volume of its stockpiles or the detailed number of missiles fired. It would therefore be incorrect to claim that US arsenals are empty.
The problem lies elsewhere. Several stockpiles are reported to have fallen below the levels deemed necessary to sustain a new high-intensity campaign, particularly in the Western Pacific.
The US military can still conduct operations. It has substantial stocks. But it can no longer treat every missile as immediately replaceable.
Patriot interceptors are the top priority
The PAC-3 MSE protects forces against ballistic missiles
The Patriot system does not use a single type of missile. It can deploy several interceptors tailored to different threats.
The PAC-2 Guidance Enhanced Missile-Tactical is manufactured by RTX. It destroys its target with an explosive charge and a cloud of fragments. It can engage aircraft, cruise missiles and certain ballistic missiles.
The PAC-3 MSE, produced by Lockheed Martin, operates on a different principle. It uses hit-to-kill technology. It does not merely seek to explode near the threat; instead, it strikes it directly at very high speed.
Its active radar seeker guides the missile during the terminal phase. Its dual-pulse rocket motor allows it to conserve energy for final trajectory corrections. This feature is important when countering a ballistic missile that is descending rapidly and may slightly alter its trajectory.
The PAC-3 MSE forms the lower tier of the missile defence system. It protects a more limited area than THAAD, but it can defend an airbase, a command centre, a port or a concentration of forces.
Demand has become global. The United States must replenish its stocks, support Ukraine and deliver to the many countries that have ordered the Patriot system.
Lockheed Martin delivered 620 PAC-3 MSEs in 2025. This volume already represented an increase of more than 20 per cent compared with 2024.
The new target is far more ambitious. A framework agreement concluded in January 2026 provides for an increase in annual capacity from around 600 to nearly 2,000 interceptors over a period of up to seven years.
This is not simply a matter of doubling the workforce at an existing factory. New equipment must be installed, more suppliers qualified, engine production ramped up, more seeker heads produced, and each missile tested before delivery.
The theoretical capacity will therefore not be available immediately.
THAAD intercepts higher and further
The THAAD fulfils a different mission. It is designed to destroy ballistic missiles during their terminal phase, when they are re-entering the atmosphere and approaching their target.
Like the PAC-3 MSE, it uses a direct hit. Its interceptor does not carry a conventional explosive warhead. It destroys the threat through the kinetic energy of the collision.
THAAD operates at a higher altitude than the Patriot. The two systems can therefore form a layered defence.
The first shot is entrusted to THAAD.
If the target gets through, the Patriot can attempt a second interception at a lower altitude. This sequence increases the chances of destruction, but it uses up several missiles against a single threat.
This expenditure is sometimes necessary. A single ballistic warhead can destroy an airfield, a fuel depot or a command centre. The interceptor is expensive, but the target being defended is worth even more.
However, reserves remain limited. Public estimates put US stocks at around 534 THAAD interceptors by the end of 2025. The exact number is classified.
Annual production stood at around 96 units. The new agreement with Lockheed Martin aims for a capacity of 400 interceptors per year.
This increase of more than fourfold highlights the scale of the problem. It also reveals how long-standing the issue is. The United States has long purchased THAAD in small quantities. Suppliers have organised their facilities to meet this limited demand.
It is impossible to rapidly transform a small-scale production line into a mass production line.
Naval missiles protect allied fleets and territories
The SM-3 destroys missiles outside the atmosphere
The Standard Missile-3 is integrated into the Aegis combat system. It can be launched from destroyers and cruisers, as well as from Aegis Ashore land-based installations.
The SM-3 and the SM-6 have similar names, but they do not fulfil the same missions.
The SM-3 is primarily designed to counter short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. It destroys its target outside the atmosphere using a kinetic impact vehicle.
After launch, several propulsion stages accelerate the interceptor. The impact vehicle then separates from the missile. It uses its infrared sensors to locate the target and small thrusters to adjust its trajectory.
The SM-3 Block IIA has more powerful engines and a more capable impact vehicle than previous versions. It was developed in collaboration with Japan.
The US stockpile of SM-3s was estimated at around 414 missiles by the end of 2025. The campaign against Iran is thought to have used up part of this stockpile, though not to the same extent as ground-based systems.
The US budget for 2027 provides for the procurement of 78 SM-3 Block IB and 136 SM-3 Block IIA missiles. However, the first deliveries could take between 36 and 39 months after funding is secured.
This is a considerable delay. A missile fired today will not necessarily be replaced before 2029.
The SM-6 becomes the Navy’s multi-role missile
The SM-6 is one of the most versatile weapons in the US arsenal.
It can engage aircraft, drones, cruise missiles and certain ballistic missiles during their terminal phase. It can also strike ships.
This versatility is based in particular on an active radar seeker derived from AMRAAM technology. The missile can receive information from the firing ship’s sensors or other connected platforms.
A destroyer can therefore launch an SM-6 against a target detected by another vessel, an aircraft or a remote sensor. This capability is essential when facing missiles flying at low altitude, sometimes below the ship’s radar horizon.
The SM-6 protects carrier strike groups, forward bases and sea lanes. It would also be indispensable in a conflict with China.
RTX is set to increase its annual production capacity to over 500 missiles. The draft budget for 2027 provides for an order of 540 units.
This production rate appears high. However, it must support several missions using the same missile. Any SM-6 used against a drone or a cruise missile is no longer available to defend an aircraft carrier against a more complex attack.
Deep-strike missiles have been used in large numbers
The Tomahawk remains indispensable in the early stages of a war
The Tomahawk is a subsonic cruise missile launched from a ship, a submarine or certain land-based launchers.
Its range exceeds 1,609 kilometres (1,000 miles). It flies at low altitude and follows a pre-programmed trajectory towards its target. Its navigation system combines, in particular, inertial guidance, satellite data and terrain matching.
The Block V variant features upgraded communications and navigation systems. The Block Va variant can target moving vessels. The Block Vb variant is equipped with a warhead suited to a wider variety of land-based targets.
The Tomahawk is particularly useful at the start of a conflict. It enables strikes against radar installations, command centres, anti-aircraft batteries, depots or infrastructure without immediately exposing manned aircraft.
This effectiveness explains its high rate of consumption.
According to the CSIS, US forces are reported to have fired more than 1,000 Tomahawks during the campaign against Iran. This estimate represents a major blow to the industry.
The United States had ordered an average of just 86 per year over the previous ten financial years. Recent production is said to have remained below 200 units per year.
In other words, a few weeks of war would have used up the equivalent of several years’ worth of production.
RTX aims to increase capacity to over 1,000 Tomahawks per year. The Pentagon plans to request 785 missiles in the 2027 budget.
However, the first units from this order may not enter service until March 2030. The production lead time is estimated at around 34 months after the contract is signed.
The contrast is stark. A submarine can fire several missiles in a matter of minutes. It takes the industry several years to replace them.
The JASSM enables aircraft to strike without penetrating defences
The Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile is an air-launched cruise missile.
Its airframe is designed to reduce its radar signature. The missile uses inertial navigation, a jamming-resistant satellite system and an infrared seeker to identify the final point of impact.
The JASSM-ER has a range of over 926 kilometres (500 nautical miles). It enables a bomber or fighter to strike a target without penetrating deep into the area covered by enemy air defences.
It can be carried by several aircraft, including the B-1B, B-2, B-52H, F-15E and F-16.
According to CSIS estimates, more than 1,100 JASSMs were reportedly used during the campaign against Iran.
The industrial situation is, however, less critical than for the Tomahawk. The US Air Force has been ordering them at a relatively high rate for several years. Deliveries from previous contracts should therefore enable a quicker replenishment.
This difference shows that stable pre-war production is more important than a budget increase after hostilities have begun.
The PrSM gives ground forces a new range
The Precision Strike Missile is gradually replacing the ATACMS.
The PrSM can be fired from M142 HIMARS and M270 launchers. Its first version has a range of approximately 60 to over 499 kilometres. Future upgrades are expected to increase this range and enable attacks on moving targets.
The missile is more compact than the ATACMS. A HIMARS pod can carry two PrSMs, compared with just one ATACMS.
This capability gives ground forces a means of striking command posts, radars, missile batteries, logistics centres and airfield facilities located deep behind the front line.
The PrSM saw its first operational use in 2026. Stock levels were still low, as full-rate production had only just been authorised.
Lockheed Martin and the Pentagon have announced an agreement to quadruple production capacity. The manufacturer has dedicated more than 10,680 square metres (115,000 square feet) to the programme and has more than 400 employees directly involved.
The PrSM is easier to replenish in the short term than the Tomahawk or THAAD. Its initial stock was lower, but recent orders had already paved the way for an increase in production.
Air-to-air missiles are also becoming ground defence weapons
The AMRAAM is to be fitted to aircraft and NASAMS batteries
The AMRAAM is primarily known as a medium-range air-to-air missile.
It initially uses inertial navigation. The launching aircraft can transmit corrections to it during flight. In the final phase, the missile’s on-board active radar directly tracks the target.
The aircraft can therefore turn away after firing without having to continuously guide the weapon until impact.
The exact range of recent versions remains a sensitive issue. It also depends on altitude, launch speed, the target’s trajectory and the manoeuvres performed.
The AMRAAM is integrated into the F-15, F-16, F/A-18, F-22, F-35, Eurofighter Typhoon and JAS 39 Gripen. It is also used in the NASAMS surface-to-air system without requiring any fundamental modification to the missile.
This dual use is driving up demand. The same AMRAAM may be required to arm a US fighter, bolster a European air force or protect a Ukrainian city using NASAMS.
RTX plans to increase production to at least 1,900 missiles per year. Production rates had already almost doubled between 2024 and 2025.
The company is also seeking to qualify new European suppliers. This diversification is intended to reduce reliance on a handful of US factories and speed up deliveries to NATO members.
The AIM-9X, Stinger and Javelin remain in high demand
The AIM-9X is a short-range, infrared-guided air-to-air missile. It can also be fired from the ground using NASAMS.
In June 2026, RTX was awarded a $1.1 billion contract to produce AIM-9X Block II missiles.
The group aims to increase its production capacity to 2,500 missiles per year.
The Stinger is designed for close-in air defence. This portable missile can be fired from the shoulder, from a vehicle or from certain airborne platforms. It uses an infrared seeker and can engage helicopters, low-flying aircraft and certain drones.
Production had been scaled back for years. The war in Ukraine has forced RTX to re-engage suppliers and seek European cooperation with Diehl Defence.
The Javelin remains one of the West’s leading anti-tank missiles. Its infrared seeker allows it to operate on a ‘fire-and-forget’ basis. It can attack a tank from above, where its armour is generally weaker.
The annual production capacity of the Javelin programme was due to increase from 2,400 to 3,960 missiles by the end of 2026.
These weapons are not at the heart of the crisis triggered by the Iranian campaign. They do, however, demonstrate that the strain affects almost all categories of guided munitions.
The bottlenecks lie within the complete missile
A missile is not simply a tube filled with explosives.
It comprises an engine, an ignition device, a durable casing, a guidance system, actuators, sensors, a power supply, a warhead, safety fuses and software.
The main obstacle often lies with solid-propellant rocket engines.
The propellant must be mixed with great precision. It is then poured into the engine casing and allowed to cure for a controlled period. Even the slightest bubble, crack or variation in composition can cause erratic combustion or the destruction of the engine.
Nozzles must withstand extreme temperatures and pressures. Internal insulation prevents hot gases from damaging the structure. Energetic materials require specialised facilities, strict safety regulations and significant distances between workshops.
The United States still relies on a small number of manufacturers for several components. Northrop Grumman and L3Harris Technologies play a central role in rocket engines. Nammo is also developing new capabilities on US soil.
The Pentagon has invested an additional $32.7 million by the end of 2025 to increase the production of nozzles and insulation materials. Eight investments in this sector totalled $120 million at that time.
These sums are helpful, but modest given the requirements.
Another challenge concerns radar and infrared seeker heads. Their production requires electronic components that are resistant to vibrations, acceleration and temperature fluctuations. Not all civilian components can be fitted to a missile.
Manufacturers must also have test benches. A rocket engine must be tested. A guidance system must be verified. The complete missile must undergo checks before being accepted.
Adding a second shift at the final assembly plant is pointless if the supplier of engines, sensors or electronic components cannot keep up.
Political pressure is directed squarely at industry leaders
Donald Trump is no longer content merely to demand an increase in production rates. His administration wants to change the financial incentives for defence contractors.
An executive order signed in January 2026 provides for the identification of companies that are falling behind, failing to invest sufficiently in their capabilities or giving insufficient priority to US orders.
Future contracts must restrict share buybacks and certain shareholder distributions during periods of underperformance. Executives’ variable remuneration must be more closely linked to delivery times and increases in production.
The approach is politically effective. It allows the government to portray major industrialists as responsible for the shortage of weapons.
The reality is more nuanced.
Companies have often prioritised profit margins, cash flow and shareholder returns. Some have been slow to modernise their factories. Successive rounds of consolidation have also reduced the number of suppliers.
But the US government itself has created part of the problem. For decades, it has ordered small annual quantities, changed its priorities and discontinued certain product lines.
A manufacturer does not build a factory costing several hundred million dollars in response to a political statement. It needs a firm contract, sustainable funding and visibility over several years.
The new framework agreements can last up to seven years. They should enable industrial groups to sign long-term contracts with their suppliers and invest in new equipment.
The Pentagon estimates that these commitments could support around $20 billion in private investment, particularly in relation to the Patriot system and other priority weapons.
However, it is important to distinguish between three concepts.
An announced capability is not actual production. A framework agreement is not always a funded contract. A budgetary order is not a delivery.
Congress must approve the funding. The Pentagon must negotiate the contracts. Companies must build the facilities. Suppliers must be qualified. The first missiles will only arrive after that.
The conflict with China remains the true baseline scenario
The restocking of inventories is not aimed solely at Iran, Russia or the Houthis.
The primary planning scenario remains a high-intensity war in the Western Pacific.
A conflict over Taiwan would rapidly deplete stocks of Tomahawks, JASSMs, LRASMs, SM-6s, AMRAAMs and ballistic defence missiles. The distances involved would be considerable. US bases in Guam, Japan and other allied territories could come under repeated attack.
US ships would have to defend themselves against anti-ship missiles, drones, aircraft and ballistic missiles. Each Chinese salvo could force the Navy to fire several interceptors.
The key concept is stock depth. This refers to the quantity of weapons available beyond the first few days of combat.
An armed forces may possess highly capable platforms yet gradually lose its capacity for action when it runs out of missiles. An Aegis destroyer without SM-3s or SM-6s remains a sophisticated vessel, but its operational utility is greatly reduced.
The same problem affects the allies. Japan is awaiting Tomahawk missiles. Ukraine is requesting Patriot systems. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates need to rebuild their defences. NATO members are ordering AMRAAMs and other missiles.
New production will therefore have to be divided between US requirements and international commitments.
This competition may lead to delays, diplomatic tensions and difficult decisions regarding priorities. A missile delivered to an ally does not end up in a US depot. A missile retained by Washington does not protect a Ukrainian city or a base in the Gulf.
The real test will begin after the announcements
The US industrial targets are impressive. They will only be credible once the missiles actually roll off the production lines.
Increasing production from 600 to 2,000 PAC-3 MSEs per year, from 96 to 400 THAAD systems, from fewer than 200 to over 1,000 Tomahawks and to more than 500 SM-6s requires a profound transformation of the industrial base.
More buildings, machinery, energy sources, engines, sensors and technicians are needed. It also means accepting the need to fund capabilities that might seem excessive in peacetime.
Washington is rediscovering an age-old rule. A modern war consumes high-tech weapons at an industrial rate. The superiority of a missile is not enough if it exists in too small a number.
US military power will therefore no longer be measured solely by the range of its missiles or the accuracy of its interceptors. It will be measured by its ability to replace them before the adversary can deplete its stocks.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.