Following the collapse of FCAS, Germany hesitates between GCAP and Airbus. Berlin is accelerating its military investments to carry greater weight in European defense.
Summary
On November 9, 2026, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius blamed the failure of the Franco-German FCAS program on excessive political ideology and poorly conceived industrial agreements. Since the abandonment of the joint New Generation Fighter (NGF) in June, Berlin has been seeking a new strategy to replace its Eurofighter Typhoons. Two options dominate: joining the British-Italian-Japanese GCAP, slated to enter service in 2035, or backing a new European aircraft led by Airbus, potentially alongside Spain and Sweden. A decision is expected before the end of March 2027. Yet this break comes within a broader context. Germany plans nearly €140 billion in military spending in 2027, is developing autonomous drones, and is tightening its grip on strategic defense companies. Berlin is no longer merely seeking to modernize the Bundeswehr; the country intends to translate its financial and industrial clout into influence over European defense.
The German Government Blames Industry for the Failure of FCAS
Addressing the Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly in Berlin on November 9, Boris Pistorius delivered a sharp critique of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), launched in 2017 with France and later joined by Spain.
According to him, the program was built on an excess of political ambition, without defining industrial responsibilities, governance, and contractual commitments precisely enough.
The minister believes governments are not directly responsible for the failure, pointing instead to the inability of Dassault Aviation and Airbus to reach an agreement.
That interpretation warrants nuance, however. The disputed contracts were negotiated within a framework established by the participating states, and political authorities failed to arbitrate their differences before development ground to a halt.
Moreover, the abandonment of the joint New Generation Fighter (NGF), decided in June 2026, does not mean the complete disappearance of FCAS. The partners intend to preserve cooperation on drones, sensors, engines, and the combat cloud—the digital network designed to link aerial platforms.
This distinction is critical: the joint aircraft failed, not necessarily the collaborative combat system.
Differences Between Paris and Berlin Went Beyond Industrial Workshare
The rupture pits two competing visions of military sovereignty against each other.
For France, Dassault had to retain effective prime contractor leadership over the NGF. The company possesses comprehensive experience in designing, integrating, and certifying combat aircraft, notably through the Rafale.
Paris also wanted an aircraft tailored to two national requirements: carrying France’s nuclear deterrent and operating from an aircraft carrier.
Those requirements directly shape an aircraft’s dimensions, weight, airframe structure, landing gear, and mission systems.
Germany possesses neither an aircraft carrier nor a national nuclear deterrent, even though its future F-35As are slated to participate in NATO’s nuclear-sharing mission.
Above all, Berlin wanted to prevent Airbus and its German partners from becoming mere subcontractors on strategic technologies.
The disagreement centered on decision-making authority, intellectual property, and workshare distribution.
France advocated for industrial leadership capable of making rapid decisions, while Germany demanded a balanced sharing of capabilities and economic returns.
Both positions reflected legitimate national interests, yet they proved incompatible within the chosen contractual framework.
GCAP Represents the Fastest Option, Though Not the Most Sovereign
Berlin is now examining participation in the GCAP sixth-generation fighter program.
Led by the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan, the program targets an entry into service in 2035—several years ahead of the timelines envisioned for solutions emerging from FCAS.
It already has an established industrial structure: Edgewing, formed by BAE Systems, Leonardo, and Japan Aircraft Industrial Enhancement, alongside a dedicated organization for sensors and communications.
Germany would bring additional funding, a substantial industrial base, and its experience on the Eurofighter.
However, its entry would raise a familiar hurdle: the founding partners have already negotiated their respective responsibilities.
On November 2, Pistorius indicated he wanted to discuss entry terms with Italy and Japan. On November 7, he set a target for a decision in the first quarter of 2027.
Joining GCAP would allow Berlin to buy time. Conversely, securing industrial influence comparable to that of the founding members could delay the program.
The Team Gen 6 Consortium Forms the German Industrial Alternative
The alternative rests on Team Gen 6, formed in June 2026 around Airbus Defence and Space.
The consortium brings together eight companies: Airbus, Autoflug, Diehl Defence, Hensoldt, Liebherr, MBDA Deutschland, MTU Aero Engines, and Rohde & Schwarz.
Their capabilities span airframe structures, propulsion, radar sensors, electronic warfare, armaments, and secure communications.
The goal would be to develop a European fighter in the early 2040s, potentially with Spanish or Swedish partners.
Spain notably brings expertise through Indra and ITP Aero, while Sweden fields Saab—manufacturer of the Gripen—and recognized capabilities in electronic warfare.
However, no binding industrial agreement currently links these partners in a new joint program.
One challenge remains: while Airbus excels at integrating complex military systems, developing a sixth-generation stealth fighter on its own would require massive investments.
German Military Investments Are Shifting the European Balance
Germany’s true transformation extends well beyond fighter jets.
The regular defense budget reaches €82.7 billion in 2026, supplemented by €25.5 billion from the Bundeswehr special fund.
The draft budget for 2027 provides €109.7 billion in regular appropriations plus €29.9 billion in additional funds—nearly €140 billion in total.
Financial planning raises the ministry’s budget to €162.9 billion in 2029, once the special fund is exhausted.
By then, Berlin aims to spend 3.5% of GDP on defense under NATO definitions.
This surge transforms Germany into a dominant player in European military procurement.
The additional resources target munitions, armored vehicles, air defense, satellites, drones, and digital systems.
The government is also using state capital to expand its industrial clout. In November 2026, Berlin negotiated the acquisition of a 50% stake in KNDS, the Franco-German manufacturer of the Leopard 2 tank, for a reported €6.6 billion.
That transaction, whose finalization remains to be confirmed, aims to safeguard strategic technologies and place the German state on equal footing with the French state.
Drones and Satellites Become Technological Priorities
Berlin is not limiting its strategy to developing a new manned aircraft.
On October 12, 2026, Airbus and Kratos announced the first European flight of the U740 Valkyrie drone, aiming to offer an operational collaborative capability by 2029.
The aircraft measures 9.1 meters (30 feet) in length with an 8.2-meter (27-foot) wingspan, features an internal weapons bay, and can carry external payloads under its wings.
Airbus is developing the MARS mission system and its MindShare autonomy software to enable cooperation between drones and manned fighters.
This approach could complement the capabilities of the Eurofighter Typhoon without waiting for the arrival of a sixth-generation aircraft.
At the same time, Germany is considering a €35 billion military space program, notably including a constellation of more than 100 secure communications satellites.
The objective is to control the networks, sensors, and data links essential to modern warfare.
German Policy Asserts a New Military Responsibility
Berlin’s determination to carry greater weight is also taking shape on the ground.
The Bundeswehr is preparing the permanent deployment of a brigade in Lithuania, comprising roughly 4,800 military personnel and 200 civilian staff by 2027.
This presence on NATO’s eastern flank marks a major shift in Germany’s strategic posture.
Friedrich Merz’s government also intends to reduce certain technological dependencies without calling the U.S. alliance into question.
That strategy carries an inherent contradiction: Germany seeks greater European autonomy while purchasing American F-35s and considering drones developed with Kratos.
Berlin is therefore favoring progressive industrial sovereignty, built on mastering software, critical technologies, and manufacturing capacity.
France and Germany Must Now Choose Between Competition and Cooperation
For its part, Paris is preparing a nationally led Future Combat Aircraft, aiming to field conventional operational capabilities around 2040.
The abandonment of the joint NGF could thus lead Europe to develop multiple next-generation fighters, at the risk of scattering budgets and technological efforts.
Still, cooperation remains conceivable in drones, communications, and armaments.
The central question is no longer whether Germany can finance a future fighter—it has the financial means to do so.
Instead, it must decide whether to join an already structured program or assume the risks of a development effort led by its own industry.
Budgetary might does not guarantee technological leadership. The decision expected in early 2027 will show whether Berlin prefers to buy time with GCAP or invest in a longer road toward industrial autonomy.