Canada, Spain, and Italy are modernizing fighters and tankers as the F-35 centralizes NATO orders and highlights its industrial constraints.
In Summary
The modernization of NATO air fleets is taking place in a more tense environment than when most of these programs were initially launched. The war in Ukraine, Russian incursions on the eastern flank, tensions in the Middle East, and questions surrounding the U.S. commitment are pushing allies to accelerate their efforts. However, buying more does not mean receiving faster. The F-35 has become the primary Western fifth-generation fighter, to the point of concentrating a growing share of European and North American requirements onto a single industrial assembly line. Canada must replace its CF-18s while re-examining its reliance on the United States. Italy, conversely, is embracing its F-35 choice and leveraging the Cameri assembly line. Spain has bypassed the American jet in favor of new Eurofighters. All three nations are simultaneously strengthening their aerial refueling capabilities, which have become indispensable to NATO’s integrated defense plans.
Concentration on the F-35 Creates a New Industrial Risk
The F-35 has become a formidable standardization tool for NATO. Multiple allies operate or have ordered the same aircraft, sharing largely common sensors, data links, weaponry, and procedures.
This homogeneity facilitates multinational operations. However, it also creates a collective dependency.
Lockheed Martin delivered 191 F-35s in 2025, a record high. The problem is therefore not symbolic or low-volume production. Rather, it lies in the difficulty of simultaneously scaling up production rates, engine supplies, spare parts, and new software configurations.
The U.S. Government Accountability Office noted that in 2024, F-35s were delivered 238 days late on average. In 2026, it further observed that the Department of Defense had not demonstrated that Lockheed Martin would possess the industrial capacity required to meet future planned volumes. Parts shortages also remain an issue for operational readiness.
The F-35 production chain is thus becoming a strategic concern for NATO. When numerous countries seek to modernize their fleets at the exact same time, an American delay no longer affects only the U.S. Air Force—it trickles down to allies.
This dependency is detailed further in: NATO air fleet modernization.
Canada Must Modernize Its Fighter Fleet Without Losing Interception Capabilities
Canada represents the most delicate case.
Ottawa had planned to acquire 88 F-35As to replace its CF-18s. The total program budget is currently estimated at CAD 27.7 billion, encompassing aircraft, infrastructure, training, and support.
The first eight aircraft are scheduled for delivery in 2026 and 2027 at Luke Air Force Base in the United States to train flight crews. The first jet is expected to arrive in Canada in 2028. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is targeted for 2029, with Full Operational Capability (FOC) planned for 2033.
However, Ottawa is still re-evaluating the full purchase. Canada is legally committed to the first 16 F-35s, while the government continues to study the necessity of a full 88-aircraft fleet alongside potential alternatives. This debate has taken on a geopolitical dimension amid trade tensions between Ottawa and Washington and Canada’s desire to diversify its defense partnerships.
The challenge is that the military timeline leaves little margin for error. The CF-18s are scheduled to be retired in 2032. A major overhaul of the procurement plan would run the risk of a capability gap in Arctic defense, NORAD operations, and NATO commitments.
Also read: Canada F-35 procurement.
Canada Nearly Doubles Its Tanker Fleet
Ottawa is not only modernizing its fighters.
The five aging CC-150 Polaris aircraft are set to be replaced by nine CC-330 Huskies, derived from the Airbus A330. The program totals CAD 3.6 billion.
This increase is substantial. Aerial refueling allows fighters to patrol longer over the Arctic, rapidly redeploy squadrons, and participate in expeditionary operations without relying systematically on American tankers.
The nine aircraft will need to be capable of refueling all compatible fixed-wing assets across NORAD and NATO. Initial operational capability is expected around 2028–2029, with full capability targeted for 2032–2033.
The tanker is thus becoming almost as vital as the fighter: an F-35 without a tanker remains constrained by its operational radius.
Spain Bypasses F-35 Dependency with the Eurofighter
Madrid is following an opposing trajectory.
Spain had been considering the F-35, notably to progressively replace its F-18s and potentially its carrier-capable AV-8B Harriers. However, the Spanish Ministry of Defense confirmed in August 2025 that the F-35 option was no longer under consideration.
A budget allocation of €6.25 billion had previously been envisioned for new American fighters. Madrid ultimately prioritized European programs as part of a broader increase in its defense spending.
The immediate choice is the Eurofighter.
The Halcón I program covers 20 aircraft, and Halcón II adds an additional 25. These 45 new Eurofighters are set to bring the Spanish fleet to 115 aircraft. The latest jets will feature active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, the Meteor missile, new sensors, and enhanced connectivity.
This decision also supports the domestic defense industry: Spanish Eurofighters are assembled and tested in Getafe.
Spain is thus accepting the temporary omission of F-35 stealth capabilities in order to retain greater European industrial autonomy.
Spanish Tankers Provide a New Dimension for Eurofighters
In parallel, Madrid operates three Airbus A330 MRTTs.
Two aircraft were converted into tankers in 2025, and the third was undergoing conversion in Getafe in early 2026. Ala 45 reports maintaining at least one aircraft permanently available despite maintenance cycles.
Their utility extends far beyond Spain.
In July 2026, six Spanish Eurofighters participated in Exercise Pitch Black in Australia alongside two A400Ms and an A330 MRTT. This force composition illustrates NATO’s current operational logic: the fighter, strategic transport, and tanker must form a deployable and interoperable ecosystem.
Italy Converts American Dependency into an Industrial Advantage
Italy presents a third model.
Rome decided to expand its planned F-35 fleet from 90 to 115 aircraft: 75 F-35As and 40 F-35Bs, with the latter divided between the Aeronautica Militare and the Marina Militare. The additional effort is backed by an extra €2.356 billion allocated in Italian defense planning.
However, Italy is not merely a customer.
Cameri hosts the only European Final Assembly and Check-Out (FACO) facility for the F-35, as well as the only site outside the United States capable of servicing both F-35A and F-35B variants. The facility supports Italian aircraft as well as those of several European partners.
Rome is thus leveraging F-35 standardization into domestic industrial advantage.
Italy also operates KC-767As capable of utilizing both rigid boom and hose-and-drogue refueling systems. The fleet surpassed 50,000 flight hours in July 2026 and regularly supports allied operations.
To understand the constraints of this standardization, see: F-35 operational availability and maintenance.
Geopolitical Tensions Render Industrial Delays More Dangerous
The strategic timeline is no longer that of the 2010s.
Since September 2025, NATO has reinforced its eastern flank through Eastern Sentry following a series of Russian drone and aircraft incursions into allied airspace. Russia remains identified by the Alliance as the primary long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security.
Transatlantic dynamics introduce another layer of uncertainty. In September 2026, the Pentagon continues to evaluate various scenarios regarding the U.S. military footprint in Europe. Simultaneously, Canada is looking to deepen its European military ties. Consequently, several governments wish to maintain American interoperability without placing their entire procurement policy under single-source U.S. industrial dependency.
The NATO target set at The Hague in 2025—5% of GDP devoted to defense and security by 2035, with at least 3.5% dedicated to core military requirements—will further inflate simultaneous demand for fighters, missiles, ground-based air defenses, and spare parts.
The primary challenge will no longer be securing funding; it will be whether manufacturing plants can translate that funding into delivered, operational aircraft.
Airpower Now Depends as Much on Factories as on Squadrons
Canada, Spain, and Italy ultimately arrive at the same operational core through three distinct paths.
Ottawa retains the F-35 while exploring ways to reduce dependency. Madrid prioritizes the Eurofighter and European industry. Rome deepens its F-35 commitment while integrating a portion of its production domestically.
All three are simultaneously investing in aerial refueling, logistics, and interoperability.
This trend underscores a reality often overshadowed by the technical performance of combat aircraft. NATO does not merely require stealth jets, AESA radars, or long-range missiles. It must be capable of producing, delivering, maintaining, and refueling these assets at a pace compatible with an extended crisis.
The F-35 offers allies an unprecedented level of standardization. However, when fifteen or twenty air forces rely on the exact same engines, software updates, and global supply chain, interoperability can also represent a concentration of risk. In the current strategic climate, industrial sovereignty has returned to the forefront of military planning.