Washington is reviewing its military footprint in Europe. Behind the concept of “NATO 3.0,” Europe is discovering the actual cost of its conventional defense.
In Summary
The American review of its military footprint in Europe marks a turning point. Washington is not talking about an outright departure from NATO, but rather a change in hierarchy. The United States intends to transition from the role of primary guarantor of European conventional defense to that of a strategic partner. This evolution impacts bases, troops, infrastructure access, overflight rights, air assets, ships, drones, intelligence, refuelers, and long-range strike capabilities. Europe has increased its budgets, but money alone is not enough. It must produce, order, stockpile, recruit, move, and sustain forces for months. A Europe capable of defending its territory without American leadership is conceivable in the long term. It is not there yet. The real issue, therefore, is not a NATO without the United States. It is a NATO where Europeans can no longer hide behind them.
The NATO 3.0 Turning Point Reflects a Political Shift Rather Than a Simple Military Adjustment
The term NATO 3.0 is not just an empty slogan. It encapsulates an American position that is now explicit: the alliance must become more balanced, with European defense led primarily by Europeans regarding conventional forces. The review announced by Pete Hegseth in Brussels is expected to last up to six months. It covers the posture of U.S. forces, bases, access conditions, overflight rights, and how allies actually contribute to the continent’s security.
The message is harsh, but it is consistent with the U.S. strategy published in 2026. Washington considers that Europe remains important, but that American priorities are shifting toward homeland defense, competition with China, and managing other theaters. In this reading, the U.S. presence in Europe must be calibrated according to two criteria: what directly serves American interests and what Europeans are capable of handling themselves.
This review does not officially mean that the United States is leaving NATO. The critical point lies elsewhere. The United States wants to remain in the alliance but no longer wishes to be the default operational leader of the continent’s conventional defense. The nuance is decisive. It preserves Article 5, the extended nuclear deterrence, and the command structures. However, it forces Europeans to answer a long-deferred question: concretely, what is missing to defend Europe if the U.S. military reduces its presence, its operational tempo, or its immediately available assets?
The answer is uncomfortable. Europe has money, soldiers, industries, capable militaries, and two nuclear powers—France and the United Kingdom. Yet it still depends heavily on the United States for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, joint command, aerial refueling, strategic transport, integrated missile defense, electronic warfare, the suppression of enemy air defenses, and deep-strike capabilities. These domains cannot be replaced by a budget announcement. They require years of investment and a shared doctrine.
The American Review Will Gauge Bases, Access, and the Political Reliability of Allies
The visible part of the review concerns troops. The most strategic part concerns access. The United States does not just want to know how many soldiers it should keep at Ramstein Air Base, Grafenwöhr, Vicenza, Aviano, Rota, Lakenheath, or in Poland. It wants to know which countries actually authorize the use of bases, transit, overflight rights, rapid deployments, and logistical support in the event of a crisis.
This is a sensitive topic. A military base does not hold the same value if it only serves during peacetime or if it can be used during a politically contested American operation. Washington is therefore looking at the European map through the lens of reliability. Eastern European countries, such as Poland, the Baltic states, or Romania, are often perceived as more determined in the face of Russia. Certain Western European countries are seen as more cautious, more divided, or more constrained by their internal debates.
The U.S. military footprint in Europe remains substantial. At the end of 2025, the United States had approximately 68,000 active-duty personnel permanently assigned to Europe, excluding rotational forces. Germany represented the primary hub, with 36,436 personnel. Italy hosted 12,662, the United Kingdom 10,156, and Spain 3,814. Poland had only 369 permanently assigned personnel but hosted around 10,000 rotational American soldiers. This distinction is central. Permanent forces structure a long-term presence. Rotations provide flexibility, but they can be altered more rapidly.
The review will therefore likely examine three options. First option: reduce personnel permanently stationed in certain countries, especially in the west. Second option: move more assets toward the eastern flank of the alliance, near the Russian and Belarusian borders. Third option: maintain rear hubs in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, or Spain, but demand firmer guarantees regarding their operational use.
The Real American Withdrawal Begins with Critical Assets, Not Just Soldiers
A military drawdown is not measured solely in personnel. It is measured above all in high-demand, low-density assets. This is where the shift becomes serious. Recent U.S. reductions in contributions to NATO crisis forces affect capabilities that matter far more than their raw numbers suggest.
According to figures reported by Reuters, the American F-15 and F-15E aircraft available to NATO are set to decrease by one-third, down to 99 platforms. Available MQ-4 and MQ-9 Reaper drones would be cut in half, to 12. KC-135 and KC-46 refueling aircraft would drop from 79 to 63. Maritime patrol aircraft would decline from 26 to 15. Destroyers would drop from 17 to 9. NATO would only be able to rely on one allocated strategic bomber and one aircraft carrier instead of two of each, while the cruise-missile submarine would be withdrawn from commitments.
These figures do not describe a collapse of American protection. They describe a tightening pressure. The United States is reducing the upper tiers of military power: sensors, refuelers, naval platforms, long-range strikes, surveillance drones, and the means required to conduct a high-intensity campaign. For Europe, the problem is immediate. It can field brigades, fighter jets, and frigates. However, a modern force is only effective if it can see far, strike precisely, refuel, communicate, move, and sustain its effort over time.
Burden sharing is therefore not just about reaching 2%, 3.5%, or 5% of GDP. It is about replacing American functions that are often invisible to the general public. Aerial refueling allows aircraft to remain on mission. ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) makes it possible to detect, locate, and track targets. Electronic warfare protects aircraft and disrupts enemy radars. Command and control links land, air, naval, space, and cyber forces into a single maneuver. Without these, Europe possesses powerful national militaries, but a less integrated campaign capability.
The European Budget Is Rising, but Military Capacity Is Not Keeping Pace
On paper, Europe has begun to change. In 2025, all allies met or exceeded the previous target of 2% of GDP dedicated to defense. European allies and Canada increased their defense spending by 20% compared to 2024. Their collective effort rose from 1.4% of their combined GDP in 2014 to 2.3% in 2025, totaling over $574 billion, or approximately €530 billion.
The agreement at The Hague summit in 2025 set a much higher target: 5% of GDP by 2035, including 3.5% for core military spending and up to 1.5% for infrastructure, cyber defense, civil resilience, innovation, and the defense industrial base. This architecture responds directly to American demands. However, it creates a massive political challenge. Transitioning from 2% to 3.5% in core military spending forces states to make hard trade-offs between defense, debt, taxes, healthcare, pensions, education, and civilian investments.
Crucially, spending more does not guarantee having usable capabilities sooner. A military is built on industrial supply chains, ammunition, stockpiles, mechanics, bases, simulators, officers, non-commissioned officers, reservists, maintenance contracts, and doctrines. Europe scaled back its military formats for a long time after the Cold War. It often purchased sophisticated equipment in small batches instead of building up volumes suited for a protracted war.
The war in Ukraine has served as a reminder of a simple truth: mass still matters. Artillery shells, drones, radars, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles, spare parts, and repair capacities matter just as much as flagship platforms. A Europe that wants to shoulder its conventional defense must therefore finance high technology, but also stockpiles. It is less prestigious. It is indispensable.
The Russian Threat Directs a Timeline That Europe Does Not Control
Russia does not possess the combined economic power of Europe. However, it has reoriented its state apparatus entirely toward warfare. According to SIPRI, Russian federal funding for the war and other military expenditures reached approximately 16 trillion rubles in 2025, or 7.5% of GDP. The planned budget for 2026 is projected to drop to 14.9 trillion rubles, or 6.3% of GDP, though this figure could still change. Even with economic constraints, Moscow maintains a very high military effort.
This reality requires a clear-eyed reading. Europe does not need to copy the Russian war economy. It must be capable of deterring Russian aggression against a NATO member. This requires the ability to quickly move forces to the eastern flank, and to defend ports, airports, cables, power grids, satellites, ammunition depots, and rail links. It also requires air defenses capable of protecting cities, bases, and moving forces against missiles, drones, and aircraft.
The U.S. military posture has long masked European slowness. When the United States provides strategic depth, Europe can operate with smaller, more specialized militaries that are sometimes slower to mobilize. If Washington reduces its role as the primary conventional guarantor, Europeans must do the unglamorous work: standardizing, purchasing jointly, accepting industrial compromises, prepositioning, building depots, reinforcing railways, simplifying military border crossings, and recruiting.
The new NATO Force Model responds to this logic. It classifies forces according to their readiness levels: 0 to 10 days, 10 to 30 days, and 30 to 180 days. This model is more ambitious than the former NATO Response Force. However, it is not enough to list a unit on a spreadsheet. It must have its personnel, its vehicles, its ammunition, its fuel, its communications, its medical support, and its means of transport. Credibility is measured in the details.
The Consequences for Europe Will Be Military, Industrial, and Political
For Europe, NATO 3.0 could prove to be a useful shock. It forces states to move past an ambiguity. For years, many have championed European strategic autonomy in speeches while remaining heavily dependent on the United States for critical functions. Moving forward, maintaining both positions becomes untenable. If Europe wants more autonomy, it must pay the price. If it chooses not to pay, it must accept dependency and its political constraints.
The first effect will be industrial. Europeans will need to ramp up the production of ammunition, surface-to-air missiles, drones, radars, armored vehicles, electronic warfare systems, and space capabilities. They will also have to choose between industrial sovereignty and speed. Buying American can fill gaps quickly but reinforces dependency. Buying European supports local industry but requires more coordination and often more time.
The second effect will be budgetary. Countries that have already sharply increased their efforts, such as Poland or the Baltic states, will demand that major Western European nations move faster. Germany has announced its ambition to become a major conventional force in Europe, but the transformation of the Bundeswehr remains a massive undertaking. France possesses a coherent military and an independent nuclear deterrent, but its framework remains limited for a long conventional war. The United Kingdom retains high-tier capabilities but must manage constraints related to funding, availability, and modernization.
The third effect will be political. A more robust European defense requires resolving long-standing disagreements: who commands, who finances, who produces, who decides in a crisis, what role for the European Union, what role for NATO, and what role for non-EU NATO members like the United Kingdom, Norway, or Turkey. This is where the debate becomes difficult. Europe has the economic means. It does not yet have a politico-military center equivalent to Washington.
The Consequences for the United States Are Not Solely Positive
At first glance, the American shift serves Washington’s interests. Reducing European dependence frees up forces for the Indo-Pacific, homeland defense, and other crises. It also increases pressure on allies to buy more, produce more, and take on more responsibility. American taxpayers may see this as a logical correction to a long-standing imbalance.
However, the United States is also taking a risk. Its military presence in Europe is not a free favor. It grants them unique access to bases, ports, airfields, intelligence networks, trained allies, and geographical depth toward Africa, the Middle East, the Arctic, and Russia. Ramstein Air Base, Naples, Rota, Lakenheath, and Aviano do not just serve to defend Europe. They also serve global American power.
If Washington reduces its footprint too quickly, it risks losing influence. Europeans could accelerate non-American purchases, reinforce European programs, and restrict political access to certain bases during crises deemed contrary to their interests. A less asymmetrical alliance would be healthier, but also less compliant. This is the paradox of NATO 3.0: by asking Europeans to grow up strategically, the United States must accept that they will also possess more of their own independent will.
There is another risk: the signal sent to Moscow. A poorly coordinated review, announced abruptly and followed by visible drawdowns, could create a window of doubt. Deterrence relies on military capability, but also on perception. If Russia believes that NATO is hesitating, that the United States is disengaging, and that Europe is not yet ready, the danger increases. A successful rebalancing must therefore be gradual, transparent, and matched by real European capabilities.
The Question of a NATO Without the United States Remains Poorly Framed
Imagining a NATO without the United States is intellectually useful, but legally and militarily misleading. NATO is a transatlantic alliance. The United States is its central member. A NATO without them would become something else entirely. It might retain structures, habits, and certain allies, but it would lose a core part of its strategic architecture.
The real question is different: can Europe handle the bulk of its conventional defense with reduced American support? In the short term, the answer is no. In the medium term, it can sharply reduce its dependence if it invests in a continuous, coordinated, and realistic manner. In the long term, it can become the primary pillar of its land, air, and maritime defense in Europe. Yet certain areas will remain challenging: extended nuclear deterrence, space-based intelligence, integrated missile defense, global strike capabilities, strategic refueling, multi-domain command, and the capacity to sustain a high-intensity war for several months.
France and the United Kingdom possess nuclear forces. They contribute to the continent’s overall deterrence. However, they do not automatically replace the American nuclear guarantee. U.S. deterrence relies on a triad, a depth of resources, integration within NATO, and a different historical credibility. A Europe wishing to compensate for this role would have to open an explosive political debate: the extension of the French deterrent, coordination with London, European financing, employment doctrine, and political control. None of these topics are impossible. None are simple.
Article 5 itself remains frequently misunderstood. It obligates each ally to assist an attacked country, but it leaves the choice of measures deemed necessary to each individual member. It does not automatically guarantee the deployment of an American division within the opening hours. This ambiguity was long offset by the U.S. military presence and the political certainty of Washington’s commitment. If that certainty diminishes, Europeans must compensate with visible means.
The Real Test Will Be Europe’s Ability to Transform Money into Power
The debate over NATO 3.0 should not be reduced to a clash between Atlanticists and sovereignists. The issue is more concrete. Europe must determine whether it can transform hundreds of billions of euros into ready brigades, available aircraft, missile stocks, factories capable of producing quickly, robust logistical networks, and a command structure capable of conducting modern warfare.
The worst-case scenario would be a Europe that announces a lot, spends poorly, and remains dependent. The best would be an organized rebalancing: the United States remains in NATO, maintaining nuclear deterrence and strategic assets, while Europeans assume the primary burden of the continent’s conventional defense. This model would be more sustainable. It would also be more honest.
The American review therefore forces Europe to face reality without diplomatic comfort. The United States is not vanishing. But they no longer want to act as the all-risks insurance policy for a wealthy, technologically advanced continent that is now facing a direct military threat. Europe can meet this challenge. It has the economic, industrial, and human resources. It no longer has the luxury of extended timelines or vague promises. NATO 3.0 will only be credible if Europeans accept a simple truth: security cannot be indefinitely delegated.